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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays on U.S. macroeconomic
development in the 19th century. Its focus is on the role of international
trade and finance in governing the pace and nature of domestic growth.
I argue the balance of payments and the institutions that govern its de-
velopment played a larger role in U.S. economic growth than is normally
recognized.
The first essay of the dissertation lays the theoretical groundwork for the
subsequent papers. Recent literature in the economics of growth has sug-
gested that the main determinant of growth differences lies in institutions
and the political process. Thus, “proximate” causes of growth are deter-
mined by more “fundamental” national characteristics like the structure of
property rights. I argue instead that the developmental orientation of the
state emerges as fundamental in U.S. history. Most importantly, the fed-
eral government’s role in shaping and establishing financial markets and a
common money of account allowed the U.S. to escape external constraints
on growth related to the capital account.
The second paper tests the hypothesis that U.S. growth was balance
of payments constrained. This paper provides estimates of the long and
short-run import demand function. Structural break tests suggest a shift
in import demand after the Civil War. This implies that over time, main-
taining balance on current account became less relevant as a potential
constraint on growth. As a result, external events like terms of trade
shocks and changes in British monetary policy seem to have less of an
impact on growth in the latter part of the century. I explain this decline in
the income elasticity of imports as the result of the active developmental
state.
The final paper of the dissertation examines the economic crisis between
the years 1837 and the early 1840s. While traditional narrative regards
the crisis as a purely monetary event, it can alternatively be seen as a
balance of payments problem following a common pattern among small
open economies. I outline a model of assymetric balance of payments
adjustment, which suggests that the pace of industrialization in England
determines export prices and debt sustainability in the U.S.
iv
“...from time to time history catches economists at their
brilliant gymnastics and walks off with their overcoats.”
- Eric Hobsbawm
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The present work is an attempt to explore the open economy in macroe-
conomics and the theory of long run growth in economic history. In doing
so, I hope that it can build toward a reconstruction of what have lately
been dubbed the “fundamental causes” of long run growth, and a return
to broadly Keynesian economic history. The essential conclusions of the
literature on long run growth and the “new” economic history suggest that
a light, democratic state is the key to long run national success. This
dissertation argues that the “liberal” state is a historical myth, one that
arises from the core principles of Say’s law and the marginalist theory of
distribution. It will be argued here that a demand-led theory of growth and
conflict theory of distribution fit the historical record more closely. These
theories of growth and distribution reveal a world in which international
conditions often dominate national, a point that is absent from most of the
literature on long run growth.
More broadly, the lack of international considerations reflects a shift in
the understanding of history and theory in several disciplines in the last
30 years. Revolutions that were commonly understood to be the result
of structural conflict are now seen as the result of particular conditions.
That is, had Louis XVI been more attentive, the French Revolution may
2not have happened at all. Or, had King George not been so petulant, a
bloody American Revolution would have been avoided. The abandonment
of grand histories has been accompanied, in several disciplines, by the
abandonment of macro-analysis in theoretical work. In economics, an en-
thusiasm for microfoundations and a move toward Walrasian equilibrium
represented the victory of methodological individualism and the death of
aggregates. The Keynesian revolution, long aborted in modeling, had fi-
nally been defeated methodologically. The whole had been successfully
reduced to the sum of its parts.1
Thus, in addition to the theme of the role of international conditions in
economic development, the three essays share a common methodological
viewpoint. Underlying the analysis is a firm commitment to the notion
that social systems should be viewed as irreducible wholes. Societies and
economies must be understood as structured institutions. I thus agree
with Myrdal (1976) who argued that, “in regard to practically every eco-
nomic problem, scientific study must concern the entire social system...”
Though there is interaction between the individual and social, this disser-
tation adopts the perspective of Marx (1967) who suggests that societies do
more than constrain choice, they shape man himself. This notion cannot
be captured with the now fashionable approach of methodological individ-
ualism.
The current approach falls within a tradition within economics dubbed
“classical Keynesian” by Bortis (1997). This tradition is in essence a syn-
thesis of the classical theory of income distribution and the Keynesian
1It is interesting to note Koffka’s (1935) correction of the commonly used phrase, “the
whole is more than the sum of its parts.” He suggested instead that, “the whole is
other than the sum of its parts.” This captures more precisely the notion I refer to
here. The notion that the whole has a different existence than the sum of the parts
was a common feature of Gestalt psychology.
3theory of output determination. For both Ricardo and Marx, income dis-
tribution is the primary issue in political economy. However, the determi-
nants of distribution are found in the sphere of production rather than the
market. Social and political influences then determine the normal costs
of production which in turn determine normal prices. The Keynesian hy-
pothesis suggests that long run growth is constrained by the evolution of
autonomous demand and not limited by some natural or potential level
of output. The distributional and growth considerations interact to the
extent that distribution affects demand and vice versa. Defined in this
way, classical-Keynesian political economy encompasses a host of tradi-
tionally heterodox authors and schools of thought.2 As it deals with long
run normal prices and long run effective demand, the methodology of the
classical-Keynesian approach is particularly amenable to the question of
historical growth.
Rather than viewing institutions as constraints on individual behavior,
the classical-Keynesian approach suggests a concept of institutions as so-
cial phenomena. Thus, we can follow Schmoller in defining an institu-
tion as a “largely independent partial order of social life directed towards
a definite aim which provides a durable framework for persistent action”
(Schmoller, 1920 as cited in Bortis, 1997, p. 22). Institutions under the
classical-Keynesian approach have a life of their own. They also have a
“definite aim” which grants them intention. Thus, we must understand in-
stitutions as structures which, although they interact with individuals and
have feed-back effects, have an independent existence from the individuals
that participate in them.
Additionally, I have adopted Kaldor’s (1977) perspective on the develop-
2Elements of Post-Keynesian, Marxian, Sraffian, and Institutionalist political economy
are thus compatible with a classical-Keynesian approach.
4ment process. Kaldor argued that,
...both the level and the rate of growth of output of the capitalist
sector are dependent on the level, or rate of growth, of the effec-
tive demand for its products coining from outside the capitalist
sector. The pace at which both output and employment can
grow and at which industrial capital will accumulate will thus
be dependent on the growth of exogenous demand. The capital-
ist sector, beyond a certain stage, cannot grow on its own, lifting
itself by its own boot-straps. (Kaldor, 1977, p. 198)
In other words, economic growth is the result of demand, but in partic-
ular, the growth of the manufacturing (what Kaldor calls the “capitalist”)
sector will depend on sources of demand outside that sector. Since manu-
facturing holds a special place in the growth process as argued by Kaldor
(1996), long run development will be dependent on the extent of demand
for a particular nation’s manufacturing output. This demand can come
from other sectors in the domestic economy (a source which can be lim-
ited) or from exports. Additionally, the early stages of growth, particularly
for late-comers, is characterized by imbalance between exports and im-
ports which must be financed. The dependence on foreign capital implies
that it will be difficult to grow in the face of capital flight, which was a
permanent feature of the international economy during the period under
consideration. Thus, the combined result of the foreign trade multiplier
and the dependence on foreign capital is the so-called “balance of pay-
ments constraint” Thirlwall (1979). These themes feature prominently in
all three papers.
The methodology of this dissertation is thus explicitly macroeconomic in
the sense that structural relationships cannot be examined by reduction
to individual or microlevel behavior. The examination of long run diver-
gences in economies must thus consider those economies as wholes. This
bears a similarity to the historical approach of the Annales school, in its
5attempt to distinguish between la longue durée and l’historie événemen-
tielle Braudel (1980). The former is the history of the very long run which
searches for coherence among and shared characteristics in structures,
what Tilly (1984) called, “big structures, large processes and huge com-
parisons.” The latter is the history of moments, the time of “the chronicle
and the journalist.” Braudel’s three part series on civilization and capital-
ism thus distinguishes between the analytical levels of material life, eco-
nomic life, and capitalism as a whole. The three levels of analysis stress
the independent existence and causality of structures at different levels
of aggregation. He compared the levels to the floors of a house. On the
ground floor, we have material life – the history of the very short-run. The
upper stories are thought of as consisting of economic life – the history of
the machinery of exchange in the medium run. The final level, and the
most abstract, is that of capitalism itself.
The present work imitates this separation of levels of analysis. We move
from the most abstract, the question of long run development, to the in-
termediate level of medium run growth, to the description of a short-run
cycle. In proceeding, the work is divided into four sections. In the follow-
ing section (Chapter 2), I outline the basic theory of fundamental causes
of growth as outlined by neoclassical authors. In this section, it is argued
that they are untenable for historical and theoretical reasons. In Chapter
3, I offer estimates of import elasticities over the 19th century, suggest-
ing that they are compatible with the notion that the balance of payments
acts as a long run constraint on growth. Chapter 4 is a description of the
Jacksonian cycle as sharing common characteristics with other cycles that
result from financial dependency. A final chapter offers a brief conclusion.
CHAPTER 2
THE FISCAL STATE AND FUNDAMENTAL
CAUSES OF GROWTH
Introduction
The recent revival of interest in long run economic growth has brought
with it a rediscovery of economic history. Policy lessons for modern economies
are increasingly justified by reference to the historical development of cur-
rently rich nations (Eichengreen, 2011). The historical approach has how-
ever been dominated by a singular vision, particularly with regard to ques-
tions of long run growth. Though the literature has separated itself into
a threefold division of ultimate or “fundamental” determinants of growth
(culture, geography, and institutions), all three share a vision of economic
growth as a supply side process driven ultimately by a “liberal” state whose
responsibility is the protection of private property rights. To this end, the
“fundamental” growth theorists seek out historical explanations of more
or less extractive states. In particular, the colonial “reversal of fortune”
in which European colonies who were rich in the 16th century now find
themselves poor and vice versa, has captured the attention of an expand-
ing literature (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002).
While growth theorists reassert the importance of the liberal state, re-
cent developments among historians, sociologists, and political scientists
7have begun to rethink its historical relevance. The Schumpetarian (1954)
conception of the tax state as integral to industrialization has been revived
by a rapidly growing literature on the European fiscal military state.1 Ad-
ditionally, a trend among development economists, led primarily by Chang
(2002), has been to revise the histories of rich nations in light of their
modern policy recommendations to the developing world. This has been
accompanied by work on the “developmental state,” a term used most re-
cently to describe the East Asian experience (Woo-Cummings, 1999) but
one that has roots in Latin American political economy as well (Caldentey,
2008). Finally, in the context of the U.S., rejecting the “liberal myth” in
a variety of arenas has been increasingly popular.2 Even in the early na-
tional period, the U.S. state apparatus can be seen as intimately involved
in the growth process. The implication of this literature has been that con-
solidation of state power, and in particular fiscal power, is associated with
long run growth. Thus, colonial divergence may be explained by the orien-
tation of the state toward national development rather than its protection
of property rights.
The two distinct trends attempt to characterize postcolonial political
economy in the Americas in very different lights. Surprisingly, however,
there is very little contact between them. Though perhaps the result of
the insularity of disciplines, a central problem has been that while the
fundamental causes literature rests on well established growth theory, the
connections between the expansion of the fiscal state and growth have not
always been explicit. The rise of endogenous growth theory has allowed a
1Brewer’s (1990) book is a classic in this literature. See also Bonney’s (1999) introduc-
tion to a collection of essays on the rise of the fiscal state in Europe.
2See for instance Edling (2003), John (1997) and Novak (2008). One could of course add
that the liberal myth has been out of fashion among some groups of historians since
the “commonwealth” studies of the 1940s.
8clear connection between theory and the history of the liberal state, but the
alternative literature on the fiscal state has in many ways avoided growth
theory in favor of purely historical narratives.
While endogenous growth theory focuses on the supply of “factors of
production” and savings decisions in particular (Cesaratto, 1999), an al-
ternative tradition exists which emphasizes the autonomous components
of demand (Commendatore, D’Acunto, Panico, & Pinto, 2003). Viewed from
this perspective, the central problem of slow growth among former colonies
has not been one of factor accumulation or productivity growth per se, but
the slow growth of autonomous demand. In particular a central long run
problem for the Latin American economies has been what McCombie and
Thirlwall (1994) call the “balance of payments constraint.” That is, exter-
nal balance may require adjustment by way of income movements. The
growth of domestic demand then is limited by the rate consistent with
balance of payments equilibrium. Though a permanent feature of Latin
American development, for the U.S., the balance of payments became in-
creasingly irrelevant as a constraint on domestic growth over the course of
the 19th century.
This chapter suggests that the concept of a fiscal state and its effect
on the growth of demand is a more useful framework for understanding
the historical evolution of postcolonial economies in the Americas than the
fundamental causes literature. The fiscal powers of the state, interpreted
as its tax capacity, monetary sovereignty, and debt relations, differ in de-
gree among the former colonies as a result of the nature of their entry into
world trade. The relative underdevelopment of fiscal powers of Latin Amer-
ican economies and the relative strength of the fiscal powers of the U.S. are
the result of particular sets of economic interests established during their
9respective colonial periods. The result has been a Latin American balance
of payments experience in the 19th century characterized by a narrow fo-
cus on primary commodity exports and general financial dependency.
The chapter then proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes the
literature on the fundamental causes of growth, emphasizing their relative
agreement on the “proximate” character of growth. A second section sug-
gests that the emphasis on the supply side of economic growth rests on
shaky grounds both theoretically, as a result of the famous capital debates
of the 1970s, and historically. A third section outlines the literature on the
fiscal military state, with particular emphasis on the development of fiscal
powers in the U.S. and the comparative lack of these powers among sev-
eral Latin American states. A concluding section suggests that the fiscal
powers and developmental orientation of the state are intimately related to
the long run balance of payments experience.
The Fundamental Causes of Growth and
Colonial Divergence
The literature on the fundamental causes can in some sense be thought
of as an historical attempt to justify the modern policy prescriptions of
property rights, contract enforcement, and independent, “technocratic”
economic institutions. While the proximate causes of growth are gener-
ally taken to include the accumulation of factor supplies (most notably
influenced by savings preferences) and the growth of productivity, the
fundamental causes seek to explain the determinants of preferences and
structures taken as exogenous in the proximate models. Interestingly, the
notions of “fundamental” and “proximate” causes in relation to economic
growth appear much earlier in Maddison (1988). He uses the terms in a
10
somewhat different sense than the mainstream authors we shall review.
Maddison distinguishes between those factors that must be in place for
growth to happen (ultimate causes) and those that govern the variation in
growth. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and other mainstream
authors seem to view the ultimate/fundamental causes as governing the
long run pace of growth through the proximate causes. These fundamental
causes are composed of three categories: geography, culture, and institu-
tions (ibid.). A full treatment of this extensive literature is beyond the
scope of the current paper, thus a brief summary noting the implication of
these theories for colonial divergence follows.
Geography
The first set of fundamental factors concerns geography, understood as
those natural resource endowments and climate conditions that affect the
accumulation of factors and productivity directly, or indirectly through
their effect on institutions. The most direct explanation is one that origi-
nates with Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws (2011). Montesquieu argued
that hotter climates would produce authoritarian political structures, and
lazy and unproductive workers. The argument has been revived most re-
cently by Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008). Collecting data on temperature
and precipitation for a panel of 125 countries between 1950 and 2005,
they suggest a variety of direct impacts of climate on growth. The most
obvious is the agricultural output channel. But Dell et al. find industrial
effects that they claim are mostly related to labor supply effects under
higher temperatures. In addition they find an increase in political insta-
bility under higher temperatures which then reduces incentives to invest.
A second direct relation between geography and economic growth relates
11
to disease burden effects. Sachs (2001) has been particularly forceful in
this literature. The burden of AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in particular
are said to have severely limited the growth of labor supply. This hampers
growth directly by slowing the growth of a factor of production, but also by
creating a risky environment for investment Bloom and Sachs (1998).
Diamond (1997) argues for a more complex relation between geography
and economic growth. For him, the timing of settled agriculture is de-
termined by geographical differences. Settled agriculture in turn shaped
the development of institutions, technologies, and resistance to disease.
Eurasia thus has an early advantage with respect to agriculture and an-
imals available for domestication from which everything else follows. The
basis of the argument is the notion that the rise of a social surplus allowed
the creation of nonproductive classes (and thus a greater division of labor)
which in turn drives technological innovation.
Finally, a geographical institutional argument is at the center of work
like Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) who argue that initial geographic en-
dowments determine institutions through their effect on income distri-
bution. Thus, initial resource conditions determine income and human
capital distribution, which in turn determines political institutions. In-
stitutions in turn influence the distribution of human capital and income
distribution. Development then depends on both factor endowments and
institutions, which can broadly be considered a function of endowments.
Engerman and Sokoloff focus their endowments explanation of institu-
tions on the American colonies. They distinguish between three essential
types of colonies: mineral, plantation, and settlement. In the mineral
colonies, and plantation colonies, labor and land endowments are abun-
dant, while in in the settlement colonies, only land is in abundance while
12
labor is scarce.
The conditions present in the northern English colonies then lent them-
selves to settlement. Harsh climate and land factors only allowed for
smaller, family size farms. Growing seasons were shorter, the soil was
poor, and the terrain was uneven, leading to subsistence farming. How-
ever, land was abundant, and small farming had low capital requirements,
discouraging large concentrated land holdings.
In addition, in these colonies, European immigrants were the primary
source of labor supply. Outside of the southern colonies, slave labor was
not used extensively, and native populations were sparse. Thus, the North
American colonies were somewhat more homogenous in terms of wealth
distribution.
This is in sharp contrast to the Caribbean and South American colonies.
Engerman and Sokoloff separate out these colonies into two types. One
type had fertile lands that supported cash crops such as sugar. Crops
grown in these colonies experienced greater economies of scale than those
in North America. Thus, the development of large concentrated landhold-
ings was common. In addition, this larger scale production supported the
use of slave labor. Specialization in this kind of agricultural output led
to the economies dominated by the production of cash crops. Even af-
ter abolition, inequality persisted for a long time due to a lack of political
power among the lower classes. The second type of these colonies were
established by the Spanish, and focused on mineral extraction and some
agricultural production. Making use of native populations, the Spanish
colonizers established an economic structure not unlike the first type of
colony. Engerman and Sokoloff then argue that without such a large na-
tive population, the massive concentrations of wealth established in these
13
colonies would not have been possible. So we see that the Caribbean and
South American colonies were characterized by inequality early on, and
continued inequality through political exclusion.
Finally, Engerman and Sokoloff argue that the greater income equality,
as well as the relative labor scarcity of the northern colonies, gave incentive
to extend suffrage. Labor scarcity persisted even as the colonies gained
independence. In addition, the scarcity of labor, particularly in new states
joining the union, inspired the extension of suffrage to attract settlers.
The relationship between suffrage institutions and relatively equal in-
come distribution and growth is not spelled out explicitly in Engerman
and Sokoloff’s work. The implication, however, is that democratic institu-
tions will lead to greater protections of private property rights, and checks
against expropriation by the state.
We may conclude by noting some potential objections to geographic de-
terminants of long run growth. Industry features prominently in the de-
velopment process as a result of its unique qualities (increasing returns
to scale in particular), and while its character may have geographic el-
ements, it is not clear that its presence would be geographically deter-
mined. In addition, the distribution of disease burden may just as well be
the result of growth rather than its cause. Indeed, the Centers for Disease
Control (which grew out of war-time malaria prevention programs) was
able to virtually eliminate malaria in the U.S. South by 1952 (CDC, 2012).
J. G. Williamson (2009) has also suggested that the inequality mechanism
suggested by Engerman and Sokoloff may not be historically accurate.
Instead, Williamson argues that Latin American inequality is not as per-
sistent as assumed, and in fact, widespread inequality only began in the
middle of the 19th century. Finally, we may note that it is not clear that
14
inequality has a univocal relation with growth (Barro, 2000).3
Culture
The cultural hypothesis finds its roots in Weber (2002), who begins his
famous analysis of the rise of capitalism with the observation that, “busi-
ness leaders and owners of capital, as well as the higher grades of skilled
labour.... are overwhelmingly Protestant” (Weber, 2002, p. 35). In addi-
tion, he observes that even within Germany, the Protestant state tended
to be more successful than the Catholic states. Weber then proceeds to
argue that there is a particular affinity between the Protestant doctrine of
predestination, and the “spirit” of capitalism itself.
What exactly connects the two? Weber argues that capitalism requires
the internalization of certain values which were not necessarily natural,
and were not held by noncapitalist groups (landed nobility and others).
Capitalism requires the pursuit of profit, the rational (as opposed to tra-
ditional) organization of economic activity, and finally, the treatment of
secular endeavors as a calling. The extent to which this “spirit” of capi-
talism was internalized would in some sense determine the success of a
culture within the logic of the system.4
The Protestant ethic had a special relationship to the spirit of capitalism
according to Weber. The doctrine of predestination, as the now familiar
argument goes, led to the search for proof of election. Followers were
chosen for election by God, but without a clear indication of who was
saved. Earthly behavior then could be interpreted as some proof that one
3Theoretically, the ambiguous effects of distribution on growth have been emphasized
by post-Keynesian models of growth. See for instance Marglin and Bhaduri (1990).
4Weber seems to argue that cultural concerns feature prominently in both the rise of
capitalism, and certain groups success under its rule. Of course, the argument Weber
lays out, as he continually reminds the reader, is incomplete and causation works in
multiple directions.
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had been saved. As Weber writes, “however useless good works might be
as a means of attaining salvation... nevertheless, they are indispensable
as a sign of election... In practice this means that God helps those who
help themselves” (Weber, 2002, p. 115).
The obsessive concern with salvation had thus been turned toward sec-
ular works. Faith, in other words, was demonstrated by objective results.
Weber then argues that this translates into economic behavior that is in
accordance with the spirit of capitalism. The ascetic of Protestantism en-
couraged a “uniformity of life” and a discouragement of spending for plea-
sure. Hard work, thrift, and saving were the result and savings provided
the source funds for investment and expansion of business (rather than
wasteful consumption) for the glorification of God. The automaticity of the
translation from savings to investment is provided by a religious motive. Of
course, over time, Weber observes, the accumulation of wealth secularized
this motive, but the Puritan formulation allowed the process to initiate.
More recently, the notion that culture has an initiating role in the de-
velopment of capitalism has been revived. Perhaps the most prominent
formulation is that of David Landes, who argues, “culture makes almost
all the difference” Landes (2000).5 In his lengthy treatment of the issue,
Landes (1999) argues that a collection of Western values, rooted in the
Judeo-Christian tradition, were responsible for the later economic success
of Western Europe. The fragmentation that resulted from the separation of
God and Caesar left the West open to freedom of thought and diversity of
opinion. The consequence was innovation and rapid technological adop-
tion. In addition, cultural traditions drove the adoption of property rights
as well as the virtue of thrift.
5It is worth noting in passing that Landes seems to reject strict monocausal explanations
in his earlier work.
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The cultural hypothesis has notably been promoted by a variety of au-
thors arguing variously that culture explains economic differences be-
tween East and West, racial groups, and major religions. The work col-
lected in Harrison and Huntington (2000) seems to suggest that these cul-
tural arguments are aimed directly at those who would explain economic
differences through colonial past, imperialism, dependency, racism, geog-
raphy, economic policy, and other noncultural explanations.
The cultural hypothesis has also expressed itself in the form of “so-
cial capital.” The notion, developed popularly, emphasizes social con-
tracts and trust networks. These networks help address risk of poverty
(Narayan-Parker, 1998) and reduce the risk of taking advantage of new en-
trepreneurial opportunities (Isham & Kaufmann, 1999). Leonardi, Nanetti,
and Putnam (1993) argue that empirical evidence suggests a positive rela-
tionship between social capital and growth. This particular formulation of
the cultural hypothesis is presented with more difficulty than the Webe-
rian variety, as the causal relationship between social capital and growth
is not as clear in the context of established growth theory as that of savings
preferences.
In the context of colonial experience, Véliz (1994) emphasizes the im-
portance of cultures inherited from European empires. Thus, the pro-
motion of Spanish Catholicism, a result of the Counter Reformation was
central to long run development. Thus, Iberian heritage transferred to the
South American colonies a set of cultural traditions that did not emphasize
Protestant virtues and brought a large bureaucracy and a culture of cen-
tralization. The establishment of English colonies (100 years after Spanish
colonies) was then associated with the Reformation and thus emphasized
individual effort and a decentralized political system.
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We may conclude our discussion by noting that several objections to the
cultural hypothesis could be raised. Very clearly, measures of social cap-
ital may be the result of growth rather than its cause. Acemoglu et al.
(2004) have suggested that though they shared the same history and cul-
tural roots, North and South Korea experienced a significant divergence
in growth rates after separation. More broadly, given the postwar devel-
opment of Japan, and recent growth of China and India, it appears that
capitalist growth is in fact quite flexible with respect to culture.
Institutions
The institutional argument has by far been the most popular. Its roots,
within the mainstream, lie in the work of Coase (1937), who attempted to
apply a marginalist framework to the explanation of firms and allocative
efficiency in the presence of externalities. The introduction of transactions
costs (the result of incomplete or asymmetric information) allowed Coase
to conceptualize the firm as the emergent result of individual maximiza-
tion. Institutions can then be succinctly described as, “the rules of the
game of a society... humanly-devised constraints that structure interac-
tion” (D. North, 1991, p. 5). That is, institutions reflect constraints on
the rational maximizer’s choice set, and thus allow the efficient allocation
of resources in the presence of externalities, and reduce the transactions
costs associated with exchange. The goal, in essence, is to explain the role
of noneconomic factors in the context of methodological individualism. In
describing the role of institutions in promoting growth in this section, I
will focus on the literature of the New Institutionalists rather than other
literature and conceptions of institutions, of which there are many.
The literature connecting institutions with growth is most commonly as-
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sociated with Douglass North and more recently with Daron Acemoglu and
his coauthors. The argument establishes a set of “good” institutions which
then, through a variety of channels, should be associated with economic
growth. More specifically, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) have described
a cluster of “institutions of private property,” which are contrasted with
“extractive” institutions.
It would be difficult to describe the full array of institutional setups and
connections with growth as portrayed in the literature. However, a consis-
tent theme seems to be the notion of incentives. As Acemoglu et al. (2005,
p. 416) put it, “the institutions hypothesis links incentives to invest in
physical and human capital and in technology to economic institutions,
and argues that economic prosperity results from these investments.” In-
terestingly, there is little else that is said by much of the modern empirical
work on institutions on the question of causal mechanisms. The adoption
of instrumental variable analysis has created a lot of empirical work that
tries to narrow the quantitative effect but the underlying logic has perhaps
not kept pace.
The argument is most succinctly put in D. North (1991). In his descrip-
tion of the role of institutions in growth, their role is to smooth the work-
ing of markets. Where kinship ties historically provided the information
and enforcement of contracts required for markets to operate efficiently,
North argues that institutions of private property took their place as the
size of the market expanded. Importantly, North focuses on the issue of a
capital market and the adoption of new technology, themes that reappear
throughout work by institutional growth theorists. In places where rulers
can arbitrarily seize assets (or even, North suggests, alter their value),
capital markets will not develop. Thus, savings are not connected with
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investment and capital accumulation does not take place. In addition,
the adoption of the technology of manufacturing requires effective factor
and product markets. Importantly, workers must be “disciplined” and free
to contract as they please.6 Thus, the argument suggests that the func-
tioning of neoclassical markets requires institutions to deal with imperfect
information and externalities. That is, long run growth differences are
the result of the inability to appropriately deal with centuries old market
imperfections.
The difficulty, however, lies in explaining differences in cross-country
growth rates. If institutions constrain behavior so as to achieve optimal
outcomes, then it is not clear why any group of individuals would de-
vise suboptimal institutions. In particular, (R. Coase, 1960) argues that
it is possible for agents to devise optimal institutions through the process
of exchange. Consider Coase’s (1959) famous example of radio stations.
The problem was that radio frequencies of competing radio stations could
potentially interfere with each other. Coase argued that external regu-
lation was not necessary, regardless of the allocation of property rights,
because it is possible for firms to pay each other to not interfere. Rights
to broadcast would thus end up with those radio stations who had the
higher potential economic gain. A large literature emerged suggesting that
institutions are often efficient.7
The issue of efficient institutions was particularly problematic in North
and Thomas’ (1973) famous book, The Rise of the Western World. For if
institutions were to be the drivers of long run growth, but institutions
6Thus, they have the property right to their own labor power in Marxian terms. Of
course Marx would add that the freedom to contract was accompanied by a second,
more sinister kind of freedom; the freeing of workers from their tools of production
(Marx, 1976).
7See for instance O. Williamson (1993) or Demsetz (1967) among a host of others.
20
in turn were always efficient, long run convergence should be observed.
Various ways of dealing with this problem have been devised. D. Romer
(2003) has for instance created a model in which incomplete information
about which institutions are most efficient creates a suboptimal outcome
if the mistakes people make are correlated. In that sense, cultural argu-
ment may be reintroduced to the extent that shared (incorrect) beliefs are
the result of cultural traditions. Alternatively, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Shleifer (2007) have argued that legal tradition leads to the creation
of different institutions; thus, civil law countries will have worse institu-
tions than common law countries. The legal institutions themselves are
externally generated by European colonialism in the argument made by
La Porta et al. (2007).
Finally, perhaps the most theoretically satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem has been what Acemoglu et al. (2005) call the “social conflict” view.
This approach comes close to a methodological individualist version of
Marxism, where political elites are self-interested and may enforce insti-
tutions that benefit them but not society. Even in the presence of full
information, then, society can end up with suboptimal (extractive) institu-
tions as a result of the capture of the state by self-interested elites. Greater
inequality may then be associated with worse institutions to the extent it
reflects the capture of the state by a small group of elites. Implicit in this
notion is a concept of path dependence in which the initial institutions
created by elites persist over time, reinforcing the concentration of power.
The issue of whether democratic political institutions and growth are
related has, however, been problematic for this tradition. Democracies
clearly do not have a monopoly on the protection of property rights; au-
tocratic regimes may certainly protect certain kinds of property rights as
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well. In addition, democracy may be associated with redistribution that
is in some ways inefficient. Finally, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue
that democracies, due to more equal distributions of political power, are
better able to provide a “level playing field” which allows the process of
creative destruction to operate.8
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) make a similar argument to Engerman
and Sokoloff’s story about colonial divergence but with slightly different
causation. That is, they emphasize the disease environment and its ef-
fects on settler mortality rather than initial endowments of people and
resources. High mortality rates lead to low settlement and extractive in-
stitutions. Thus, mortality rates determined the colonial strategy in place.
Much like in Engerman and Sokoloff, colonies can take an extractive or
settlement form. The key difference between the two views is that En-
german and Sokoloff assume the persistence of labor scarcity in North
America, and the persistence of inequality and labor abundance in South
America. While both argue for the persistence of institutions, then, the
Engerman and Sokoloff view seems to emphasize the persistence of geo-
graphical concerns as well. For Acemoglu et al., institutions play a much
more fundamental role, even after mortality rates declined.
The implication of these histories has been recommendations that em-
phasize independent policy-making institutions. If the main problem of
the less developed countries is the extractive nature of their elites, lim-
iting their influence over economic policy should be paramount. Thus,
8An example of the potential conflict between “good” institutions and democracy in main-
stream literature that is generally not mentioned by growth theorists is that of central
banks. Consider Eichengreen’s (1992) suggestion that the gold standard system re-
lied on the credibility of the commitment of central banks. This credibility in turn is
dependent on the absence of competing policy goals (like the pursuit of full employ-
ment domestically). Broad access to the political process undermines the stability
of the system. This theme is equally present in modern discussions of central bank
“independence” (Walsh, 2008).
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central banks, currency boards, and even fiscal policies should be run by
technocrats or international institutions who exhibit more responsibility.9
Notably, even these limits may not be enough. Eichengreen (1992) has ar-
gued that the collapse of the gold standard was in fact the result of the rise
of working classes and the loss of policy credibility among participating na-
tions. The troubled experience of peripheral nations even at the height of
the gold standard can then be attributed to their lack of cooperation and
credibility.
The central concern has thus been containing the predatory nature of
the state. In this sense, all the fundamental causes that emphasize, in
the end, a liberal state are in line with North’s (1981) view of economic
development. In his view, economic development is the result of efficient
property rights structures, enforced by the state, which has, however, con-
flicting motives to maximize its own wealth. In this sense, North saw the
U.S. in the 19th century as a golden age in which severe restraints were
placed on the extractive powers of the state.
The fundamental causes literature has then been focused essentially on
the accumulation of factors, and productivity. To the extent that geog-
raphy, culture, or institutions encourage the growth of factor supplies -
mainly capital - through the reward to saving or the growth of produc-
tivity by protecting the intellectual property rights of invention, they can
be considered fundamental determinants of a supply side growth process.
Additionally, a major theme of the literature has been the notion that a
light state (whether the result of geographic endowment, culture, or in-
stitutional processes) is the reason behind the success of the developed
countries. The state should then protect property rights and underwrite
9Witness the popularity of “independent” central banks, or the fiscal policy limits im-
posed by the Maastricht treaty.
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markets, but do little else.
Supply Side Visions
The focus of the literature on long run growth on supply side factors
is unsurprising given its roots in the theory of endogenous growth. An
important consequence of the theoretical shift in growth theory in the
1970s and 1980s is that it restored the role of savings in economic growth
(Cesaratto, 1999). Where it had been just a matter of levels in Solowian
models of growth, savings could now affect the long run steady state rate
of growth.10 Without attempting to summarize this substantial literature,
it may be said that it is an attempt to “endogenize” the steady state by
allowing technical change to be determined from within the model.11 The
consequences of endogenizing growth in this way is a return of savings to
the driver’s seat of growth.12 In addition, because endogenizing technical
change involves introducing market imperfections (spillovers, increasing
returns, etc.), the savings rate chosen by agents in the model may in fact
be suboptimal. Thus, the role for policy can be reintroduced, in some
sense inspiring the contributions to “fundamental” causes of growth de-
scribed above.
In these models of growth, aggregated demand is usually assumed to
passively adjust to a long-term supply side limit. In particular, in most
models, the accumulation of capital is assumed to adjust to planned sav-
ing. This process, at the heart of modern versions of Say’s law, implies
10It is perhaps no coincidence that the 1970s and 1980s also represented the era of the
“revenge of the rentier” (L. L. Pasinetti, 1997).
11See P. Romer (1994). Some seminal papers include Uzawa (1965), Arrow (1962), and
M. Frankel (1962)
12It may be noted that human capital and technical progress in many models are the
result of a different kind of savings decision - one of time - but the point remains.
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that consumption must be sacrificed for accumulation to take place. This
in turn is the result of assuming an investment demand function that is
elastic with respect to the rate of interest Garegnani (1979). In the case
where higher income groups save more than lower income groups, this im-
plied that inequality was a prerequisite for growth.13 More recently, main-
stream growth theory has been somewhat kinder to the laboring classes,
arguing that there may be some externalities that imply that there are lim-
its to inequality’s encouragement of growth (Alesina & Perotti, 1996). The
essential mechanism remains, however, and the notion that consumption
must be sacrificed for accumulation is at the heart of modern growth the-
ory.
A central problem facing any theory of growth in which savings drives in-
vestment is the well-known result of the Cambridge capital debates. This
is that the demand for capital, understood as a produced means of pro-
duction, cannot be said to be univocally related to its price. The potential
of reswitiching and reverse capital deepening imply that we cannot rely on
factor substitution as a key determinant of either distribution or growth.
As Garegnani (2000) points out,
the roots of reverse capital deepening, as well as of the re-switching
of techniques, lie in the effect of changes in distribution (rate of
profits) upon the relative prices of the alternative sorts of capi-
tal goods required in the processes of production that are being
compared. (Garegnani, 2000, p. 433)
The more “capital intensive” techniques of production may in fact be cho-
sen at a higher rate of interest. This is because, as pointed out in Gareg-
13See for instance R. Nelson (1956). Of course the view that inequality may be a prereq-
uisite for growth is shared by a host of traditions in economic thought. A full review
would be beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, worth noting that to the extent
that countries who develop later would have higher initial fixed costs to industrializa-
tion as technology progresses. If we assume that savings is the source of investment,
this implies that countries who develop late must have even greater levels of inequality
than those who developed earlier.
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nani’s quote above, distributional changes can alter the price of capital.
A rehashing of the results of the capital debates is not necessary and
a host of summaries are available.14 For our purposes, there are two
important results. First, the rate of interest cannot be seen as an equi-
librating mechanism bringing savings and investment in line. Indeed, the
rate of interest cannot be determined in the market for loanable funds at
all. Second, there is no guarantee that the operation of supply and de-
mand will bring resources into full employment. Thus, the consequences
for Solowian growth theory and endogenous growth theory alike are devas-
tating. The supply of savings cannot govern the long run rate of growth as
in endogenous growth theory or approaches to a steady state as in Solow.
In addition, the possibility that markets will not bring about full employ-
ment of factors suggests that one cannot ignore the possibility of demand-
determined unemployment equilibrium, even in the long run (Eatwell,
1983).15
In addition to the theoretical problems with interest elastic capital accu-
mulation, there are empirical problems as well. A host of empirical work
on investment has found that it does not seem to be sensitive to the cost of
capital. Chirinko (1993) in a summary of the literature finds that, “output
(or sales) is clearly the dominant determinant of investment with the user
cost having a modest effect.” Thus, it is empirically difficult to justify the
14See for instance Harcourt (1972) or L. Pasinetti and Scazzieri (1990)
15We may note another consequence for the theory of fundamental growth. The capital
critiques, though brushed off by many, did indeed produce a change in the neoclas-
sical theory of markets. As Garegnani (1976) and Milgate (1979) point out, the result
was a “change in the notion of equilibrium.” Faced with the inability to describe cap-
ital as a single quantity, mainstream theory moved toward the Walrasian conception
of markets. General equilibrium implies that each capital good has its own rate of
return, thus avoiding the complications of associating a capital aggregate with the
rate of profits. Of course, the cost of the movement toward general equilibrium and
intertemporal models is that one can no longer speak of a uniform rate of profit. The
uniform rate of profit across sectors captures the classical notion of competition, and
without it, these models lose a good deal of relevance, as Garegnani (1976) points out.
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notion that capital accumulation is driven by savings, and seems much
more likely that investment is the result of demand.16
It is, even in long run periods of rapid change, difficult to justify the
notion that the scarcity of savings governed the pace of capital accumula-
tion. It seems to be the case that the financial system is able, in periods
of rising demand and technological change such as the industrial revolu-
tion, to support increases in investment. On this point, it is worth quoting
Braudel at length:
I cannot avoid the impression that, even in the eighteenth cen-
tury and if anything more so then, the money accumulated far
exceeded the demand for capital; that England for instance cer-
tainly did not summon up all her reserves to finance her indus-
trial revolution, and that much more effort and investment might
have been forthcoming than actually appeared...which explains
why... the coal mines in the eighteenth century were able, with-
out undue delay or difficulty, to find the fixed and circulating
capital necessary to work them, when the occasion demanded
it. (Braudel 1982, p. 398-9).
We see, then, that capital accumulation is likely the result of growth in
demand, rather than supply side conditions, particularly the level of the
rate of interest.
Labor as a productive factor that is exogenous to demand may also be
a problem because, as Kaldor (1966) and Lewis (1954) point out, surplus
labor is often concealed in the agricultural sector, to be drawn out as man-
ufacturing and services demand. Agriculture, it is said, absorbs surplus
labor and thus labor is elastic to demand. In addition, patterns of immi-
gration will also be such as to respond to economic activity in the “modern”
sector (Cornwall & Cornwall, 2001). The flexibility of labor-force participa-
16It may be noted that in the short-run, the rate of interest may indeed be negatively
associated with spending to the extent it affects residential and consumer durables
spending. This does not, however, imply that increases in savings cause higher levels
of investment through interest rate adjustments.
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tion and the presence of international migration suggest that labor supply
should be considered endogenous to GDP growth. While the economic
historian sees the immigration and internal migration of labor as the re-
sponse of factor flows to relative scarcities, we shall view it through the
lens of demand led growth.
Historical evidence of the endogeneity of labor supply is readily available.
For instance, in the U.S., waves of immigration in the 1840s and 1880s
were clearly associated with domestic economic activity. As Margo (2000)
argues, “During phases of the American business cycle, immigration to
the United States surged,” which in turn affected the 19th century labor
force.17
Changes in labor force participation were also clearly timed with the
expansion of industry. Goldin and Sokoloff (1984) have argued that the
importance of women and children in industrialization in the Northeast
stems from their low productivity on the farm. This could be interpreted
as a form of “disguised unemployment.” The result of this was that over
the 19th century, the labor force grew faster than the population (Margo,
2000). This suggests that natural increase was no limit on the growth of
industry.
Finally, we may suggest that even productivity responds to the level of
demand in the economy. Kaldor (1966), building on Young (1928) and
Verdoorn (1993), suggested that the growth of productivity itself was en-
dogenous to economic growth. Of course, this is a principle that can be
found in some of the endogenous growth theory described earlier. Since
Smith (1776), however, it has been known that economic growth inspires
17Margo does, however, argue earlier in the chapter that, “increases in the supply of
labor account for the largest fraction of aggregate growth in the nineteenth century...”
It is difficult to reconcile this view with the view that labor supplies responded to the
business cycle.
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invention.18 To the extent that the growth of the economy pushes against
its capacity limit, technological changes occur more rapidly. Thus, as
Kaldor points out, we do not find ourselves in Ricardo’s world where the
growth of population limits manufacturing growth as more and more labor
and capital are devoted to food production. Instead, a relatively small pro-
portion of resources are dedicated to food production with a much larger
population.
The concept of endogenous productivity growth emerged in economic
history in the 1960s as well. The concept of “learning by doing” sug-
gests that manufacturing productivity increases may be endogenous to the
growth of manufacturing output.19 Davis and Stettler (1966) have argued
that this principle explains the productivity growth in antebellum textile
manufacturing, long after new capital had been installed. Of course, the
notion of “learning by doing” makes a great deal of sense to the extent
that technology is embodied in physical capital goods.20 We might also
recall David Landes’ (1969) suggestion that many of the inventions of the
industrial revolution were in fact motivated by necessity. Thus, he writes,
“the demand for coal pushed mines deeper until water seepage became a
serious hazard; the answer was the creation of a more efficient pump, the
18Smith (1776) argues that the division of labor, which in turn is limited by the extent
of the market, inspires innovation. A similar story seems to be the case for the U.S.
during the 19th century. As Nelson and Wright (1992) note, “relatively little of the
American performance during this era was based in science, nor even on advanced
technical education. American technology was practical, shop-floor oriented, built on
experience.”
19The seminal references here are Arrow (1962) and David (1973, 1985). Thus, the
Kaldor-Verdoorn law has some overlap with some of the work in endogenous growth
theory, as noted. However, in many of the endogenous growth models, productivity
growth or inventions are the result of the amount of resources devoted to human cap-
ital or R&D. In this sense, supply driven productivity growth has been reintroduced.
20It is worth noting the the rediscovery of “learning by doing” and other mechanisms by
which growth causes productivity changes occurred in the 1960s. This is just a decade
before the productivity growth slowdown of the 1970s which seemed to puzzle many
economists. It is strange that this productivity slowdown was not readily understood
as a result of the slowdown of growth!
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atmospheric steam engine.” Landes’ book also emphasizes the inherent
backward and forward linkages in the process of innovation that are the
result of attempts to meet rising demands.
It would appear, then, that there is substantial historical evidence that
suggests factor supplies and their productivity are responsive to the growth
of output itself. This is suggestive of the relevance of effective demand even
in the long run. Following Kaldor (1970), we may argue that expansions
of autonomous demand increase capacity utilization in the short-run, but
can increase the amount of capacity itself in the long run. In this sense,
investment is a category of induced expenditure via the accelerator mech-
anism. Kaldor emphasized that, “investment decisions must themselves
be governed by changes in the level of production” (Kaldor, 1996, p. 35).
In addition, he suggests that we must, “consider the effects of investment
on productive capacity” (Kaldor 1996, p. 34). Thus, for Kaldor, investment
is a derived demand, and creates additional capacity.
A key insight of the Kaldorian growth models is that if countries are
unable to finance ever increasing deficits, economic growth may be con-
strained by the growth of exports. Of course, it is not theoretically possi-
ble that all countries are balance of payments constrained. In particular,
countries whose currencies play a large role in international trade and fi-
nance may find themselves able to attract foreign funds indefinitely. Thus,
the British empire finds itself with a trade deficit for better part of the 19th
century. Similarly, the U.S. has run substantial trade deficits since the
1980s. The development of financial dominance encouraged by the state
then has the potential to lift a major demand constraint.
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The Myth of the Liberal State
In addition to the problems with supply side view of growth, it may be ob-
jected that the Anglo-American liberal state assumed by North, Acemoglu,
Engerman and Sokoloff, and others simply did not exist. Certainly, it has
been argued by a number historians and development economists that
late comers to industrialization have required strong participation by the
state.21 However, it should be noted that even among the currently indus-
trialized countries, the state had significant presence. Chang (2002) has
been particularly forceful in revising the historical political economy of the
currently industrialized countries. Chang has focused on technological
policies, trade policies, and other protectionist measures. Even Chang,
however, suggests that the main role of the state in U.S. development has
primarily been limited to the building of tariff walls.
The idea of the predatory or extractive state that must be defended
against has a long tradition in U.S. rhetoric. As Novak (2008) argues,
the U.S. past is often recounted in a framework of powerlessness and con-
stitutional restraint or as a constant struggle for political liberty. This has
created in some sense a cognitive dissonance where historical rhetoric and
political reality find themselves at odds.22 In this section, we suggest that
it is not clear that the U.S. state in the 19th century possessed the qual-
ities of the liberal state as argued by the fundamental causes authors. In
21See for instance Gerschenkron (1962), Amsden (2003), and Chang (2002).
22Novak (2008) tells the story of Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-SC), who sought the
1984 Democratic nomination for president. Hollings in his stump speeches told a
story about, “a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of
the GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made sure
his parents’ farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and irrigated
with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get subsidized school
lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a National Science Foundation
grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and
one day, took AMTRAK to Washington to complain to his congressman about getting
big government off people’s backs” (Novak, 2008, p. 753).
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particular, the fiscal powers of the state were established early on, with
long-term effects for development.
Perhaps the greatest emphasis in the literature on long run growth
has been on the protection of property rights. In this sense, the Anglo-
American model of development has been argued to consist of strong pro-
tections against property theft either by the state or by other citizens
D. C. North (1981). The historical record of property rights protection in
the U.S. is not as clear as is usually presented. In fact, what emerges is a
rather complex picture that suggests property rights are best thought of as
social relations, rather than relations between people and things (G. Fried-
man, 2001). Indeed, it seems that property rights and their allocation have
been continually revised so as to be, in Justice Frank Murphy’s descrip-
tion, “as broad as the economic needs of the nation.”23
Until the 19th century, the U.S. did not respect international property
rights. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 only protected U.S. citizens. In-
deed, Henn (1953, p. 43) argues, “For over a hundred years, this nation
not only denied copyright protection to published works by foreigners, ap-
plying the ‘nationality-of-the-author’ principle, but appeared to encourage
the piracy of such works.”24 Of course the well-known histories of Samuel
Slater and Francis Cabot Lowell and their study of British manufacturing
technology are a testament to this. The U.S. did not actively promote inter-
national intellectual property rights until after World War II (Ringer, 1968)
in order to protect its now dominant status as manufacturer to the world,
an example of what Chang (2002) calls “kicking away the ladder.” Even
23Justice Frank Murphy wrote the majority decision in American Power and Light Co. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission 329 U. S. 90 (1946).
24The works of Charles Dickens were particularly popular for unauthorized reproduction
in the U.S. - a fact that greatly angered Dickens who toured the U.S. in 1842 pleading
for stronger intellectual copyright protections.
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domestic patent laws throughout the 19th century could be considered
highly deficient by modern standards. In particular, no proof of originality
was required prior to the 1836 overhaul of patent legislation.
More generally, federal, state, or local governments often redefined, re-
allocated, or otherwise adjusted property rights to meet various need. For
instance both Lamoreaux (2011) and G. Friedman (2001) cite the Charles
River Bridge case as an early example of the redefinition of property rights
to meet social goals. The Massachusetts General Court in 1785 granted
a charter of incorporation to investors wishing to build a bridge across
the Charles River. The investors were guaranteed exclusive rights to col-
lect tolls for 40 years. However, once the bridge was constructed, a com-
petitor was granted the right to construct a bridge alongside the original
bridge in 1828. The original investors protested that the charter for the
second bridge was a clear violation and threat to the security of property
rights. Chief Justice Roger Taney, in his ruling on the case, suggested that
protecting the property rights of the original company would have in fact
interfered with ongoing transportation projects.
The redefinition and reallocation of property rights was ongoing through-
out the 19th century.25 As Lamoreaux (2011) notes, “sometimes these re-
allocations favored politically powerful interests; sometimes they occurred
at the behest of a majority of the voting public. Regardless, in only some
cases did the original holders receive adequate compensation” (p. 283). In
the majority of cases, the reallocation of property rights does not seem to
have interfered with activity in the affected sector, which continued as long
as there was effective demand forthcoming.26 In general, however, a de-
25The emancipation of slaves can in this context be seen as perhaps the largest violation
of property rights in U.S. history. Over half of Southern wealth was in the form of
slaves on the eve of the Civil War (Atack & Passell, 1994).
26Both Lamoreaux (2011) and Friedman (2001) seem to agree on this point, though Lam-
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tailed examination of the history of specific legislation reveals a quite com-
plex picture of the practice of property rights enforcement by the courts as
well as federal, state, and local governments. 27
More importantly, the innovation that is supposed to be so closely tied
to the respect of property rights often did not spring from the imagination
of the entrepreneur, but was explicitly funded and promoted by the state.
Early U.S. technological development was, as is well known, marked by the
use of interchangeable parts. The use of interchangeable parts was central
to what came to be called, the “American system” of manufactures which
then enabled the later introduction of the assembly line and mass produc-
tion (Hounshell, 1985). Often attributed to Eli Whitney, the use of inter-
changeable parts is much more appropriately traced back to the Harper’s
Ferry Armory (Woodbury, 1960). In addition, the Springfield Armory be-
came the central organizing agency of a network of arms producers. In
doing so, the Armory became the center, not only of technological innova-
tion, but of dissemination of information, instructing local arms producers
in best practices and management techniques (Tull, 2001). The result was,
in Best’s (1990) words, “inadvertent industrial policy” in the service of the
military needs of the state.28 Thus, the military demands of the state led
industrial innovation. In addition, Lively (1955) has emphasized the role
of the elected public official in the development of the American system,
oreaux emphasizes the democracy of ownership (paradoxically) as the reason why
reallocation of property rights did not threaten potential investors.
27Modern property rights have been argued to be associated with high growth. The cross
country regressions that these claims rely on, however, are somewhat problematic.
See for instance King et al. (2010). Likewise, Chang (2007) has accused the property
rights literature of being far too simplistic in its definition of property rights and their
assumed effects. The historian of property rights will of course be sympathetic to this
notion.
28The notion of “inadvertent industrial policy” seems to be a U.S. tradition. Block and
Keller (2011) outline what they call the “invisible hand of government.” A great deal
of technological development throughout U.S. history has been a “military enterprise”
(De Medeiros, 2003).
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who, “replaced the individual enterpriser as the key figure in the release of
capitalist energy; the public treasury, rather than private saving, became
the major source of venture capital.”
The State and Fiscal Strength
In addition, the historically more successful nations seem to be associ-
ated with growing fiscal powers and more centralized bureaucracy. Indeed,
O’brien (2007) dubs the histories of Europe as told by Douglass North and
others, “liberal narratives.” Thus, he claims, “something approximating to
a Washington Consensus has... dominated the writing of British economic
history” (O’brien, 2007, p. 180). In this vision, the Glorious Revolution
is seen as a democratic and rational triumph that set the institutional
framework for later British dominance. A longer view of history, however,
suggests that the dominance of states had much more to do with the role of
their financial sector, fiscal powers, and the empire building these allowed.
That is, the success of nations can only be understood in the context of
strong states in world that is essentially conflictual. Along the way, dis-
tributive conflict was resolved, but more often than not, it was resolved in
favor of elites. Indeed, the successive rise of European centers of power,
from the Italian city states in the Renaissance to the Dutch Republics to
eventual British dominance, seem more closely associated with financial
and military dominance as opposed to equality or democracy. The rise of
the public debt that allowed the state to finance nation building was thus
associated not with equality of property and democratic reform, but of the
alignment of financial elites and state governments.
Braudel has noted that in early modern European history, “The state
was a looming presence, the coming together of many things” (Braudel,
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1984, p. 514). That is, the state is a structural concept that reflects the
unity of a variety of things from the development of bureaucrats to con-
flicts among social classes. He goes on to argue that, “When it appeared at
any rate, the modern state distorted or shattered all previous formations
and institutions” (Braudel, 1984, p. 515). Polanyi (1957) agrees, suggest-
ing that while markets were present before the arrival of capitalism, they
were primarily external. Thus, “internal trade in in Western Europe was
actually created by the intervention of the state.” The conclusions of these
historians would then suggest that the state has played a much larger role
than as a simple protector of private property rights. Indeed, it was the
state’s intervention that broke down local barriers to construct an internal
market in the first place.
In addition, British development, as has been pointed out by Chang
(2002) among others, happened behind significant trade protections and
industrial policy. The development of industry with the encouragement of
the state seems to be the general rule. Reinert and Reinert (2005) note in
their review of mercantilism that, “production-focused mercantilist policies
have been a mandatory passage point for nations that have taken the step
from poor to wealthy, from England starting in 1485 to South Korea in the
1980s” (Reinert & Reinert, 2005).
The internal functions of the state were, at least in early modern Europe,
however, motivated by external competition. As Brewer (1990) argues,
a large and well-organized military was essential to the maintenance of
British commercial superiority, which could only be possible with the cre-
ation of a “fiscal-military” state. Military dominance was achieved in part
through a large and effective bureaucracy that could mobilize resources.29
29There is thus some truth to Charles Tilly’s observation that, “war made the state, and
the state made war” (Tilly & Ardant, 1975, p. 42). Of course, there are also linkages
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For the United States, the debate over ratification of the constitution
has been placed in a fiscal-military state context in recent scholarship that
makes use of the publication of The Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution. Edling (2003) has argued strongly for a reinterpreta-
tion of the debate along state formation lines. Textual analysis of the pub-
lications of less well known Federalists and Anti-Federalists has revealed
something of a more complicated picture than is usually recounted. Thus,
Edling argues, “To an understanding of the issues debated in the ratifi-
cation struggle, however, the functional aspects of the state, that is, what
the state does, is much more relevant” (Edling, 2003, p. 45). The state’s
extractive capacity, military ability, and centralization of authority were all
at the heart of the debate. John (2006) has similarly argued that themes
of governmental agency, the effect of federalism on 19th century political
economy, and the influence of the state on civic ideals have dominated
the recent historical literature. Ratification, then, was an attempt to con-
struct a uniquely American version of the European fiscal-military state,
reflecting what W.A. Williams called an early “pattern of empire thought.”
This played out in the early establishment of the tax powers of the new
federal government under the Constitution. The pattern of changes in tax
revenue seems to a great extent linked to war, much as in the European
case (Bensel, 1990). State revenue increased after wars, but its structure
changed as well. In U.S. tax history over the 19th century, the structure
and size of taxation can readily be split into two periods on either side
of the Civil War. In that sense, there was perhaps less of an influence of
external conflict in the U.S. case, but nonetheless, war seems to be the
primary catalyst. The fiscal-military state, envisioned by Hamilton and the
between the state building project and distributional conflict as emphasized by Poggi
(1978).
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Federalists, and modeled after 18th-century England, thus only came to
fruition after the Civil War.
The antebellum period is primarily characterized by a heavy reliance on
tariffs at the federal level. As has been repeatedly pointed out by Bairoch
(1995), the U.S. was the “mother country” of infant industry promotion.
Over the 19th century, Chang (2002) points out that the U.S. maintained
higher average tariff rates than any other country in the world. Indeed,
Bairoch (1995) has argued that there were three distinct eras in U.S. trade
policy during the 19th century. The years 1816 to 1846 Bairoch calls the
“protectionist phase,” 1846 to 1861 is dubbed an era of “modest protec-
tionism,” and finally, 1861 to 1914 a period of “strict protectionism.”
There has been considerable debate on the effects of these tariffs. In
the antebellum period, Taussig (1931) argued that the textile industry
had been initially protected by tariffs but no longer needed the tariff by
the early 1830s. Harley (1992) has estimated, however, that tariff re-
moval would have caused the share of domestic production in domestic
consumption to shrink to 10% as late as the 1850s. Irwin and Temin
(2001) have countered that simple cost comparison is inappropriate given
the different quality of the goods. They then estimate the responsiveness
of industry to changes in import prices and concur with Taussig that the
industry was independent by the 1830s. Bils (1984) has argued strongly
against this view claiming, through an estimation of a cost-quality func-
tion between the U.S. and Britain, that the textile industry would have
been wiped out without tariff protection, even in the 1830s.
In the latter quarter of the century, the story is a bit clearer. Both
O’Rourke (2000) and Clemens and Williamson (2001) have found evidence
for a relationship between tariffs and growth rates and industrialization.
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Irwin (2000) has suggested that for one infant industry at this time, the
tinplate industry, tariffs promoted its early development.
It seems, then, that import substitution through tariff policy was likely
one cause of a decline income elasticity of imports. Tariffs, however, also
play another important role. As Irwin (2004) has pointed out, Hamilton’s
tariff promotion was not exclusively for the encouragement of manufac-
tures. Indeed, Hamilton’s 1789 tariff proposal was designed to also pro-
vide for the support of the federal government and to discharge the debts
of the U.S.30 The U.S. government was heavily dependent on the tariff as
the Constitution limited congress ability to raise revenue elsewhere (Atack
& Passell, 1994). Aside from tariffs, Congress could enact excise taxes
and sell public lands. Thus, tariffs accounted for at least 80% of federal
revenue during the antebellum period.
Perhaps even more important than tariffs was the role of the federal gov-
ernment in establishing financial markets and a national currency. Sylla
(1999) compares the establishment of Hamilton’s plan for government fi-
nance to the financial revolution in England during the 18th century. The
conversion of revolutionary debts to long-term federal securities, the es-
tablishment of a national bank, and the determination of the money of
account allowed the rapid development of securities markets in Philadel-
phia, New York, and Boston. Public debt provided a relatively safe asset to
trade, as did stock in the Bank of the United States (the public securities
were in fact receivable in Bank of the United States stock) (Sylla, 1999).
It was the Civil War that fundamentally changed the fiscal foundations
of the state. Indeed, public finance was to shape U.S. financial markets
throughout the second half of the century, as the Civil War provided a
30It may of course be the case that a kind of Laffer curve in tariffs exists. Thus, the more
protectionist tariffs are, the less revenue they raise.
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strong impetus to the policies that created the national banking system
and a truly national currency. That is, the financial needs of war gener-
ated national banking policy which reflected the “political project to wrest
control over money from subnation authorities to the center” (McNamara,
2003).
In addition, it involved a massive expansion of debt and a widening of
the tax revenue base. This increase in debt issues provided a deepening
relation between private financiers and the national interest, as pointed
out by Hamilton years before. The Civil War, then, represents a massive
shift in the tax and debt structure of the U.S.31
The effect of a well funded public debt (managed, at least initially, by
the Bank of the United States) was twofold. On the one hand, as already
noted, it led to the rapid development of financial markets in the U.S. To
the extent that industrial development requires an elastic supply of credit
money, the development of the U.S. over the course of the 19th century
could in some sense be considered “finance-led,” with finance in turn being
driven by public credit.32 Secondly, the expansion of public debt had a
large impact on the creditworthiness of U.S. securities in foreign markets.
Far from worsening creditworthiness, the expansion of a well funded debt
actually increased the depth of financial markets and the willingness of
foreign capital to participate.
In addition to establishing national debt and securities markets, the fed-
eral government actively promoted the triumph of a national currency. In
the U.S., the 19th century could be characterized by a slow, sometimes
halting process in which the federal government gained control over na-
31Pollack (2009) discusses the role of war in expanding the fiscal state during the 19th
century.
32Levine (2005)discusses a good deal of the literature on finance and growth. Rousseau
and Sylla (2005) have made the argument for finance-led growth in the 19th century.
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tional currency. Battling internal exchange rates due to various metals
circulating as coin, removing foreign currency from circulation, limiting
and standardizing the expansion of private banknotes, and providing small
denomination currency for the working class were at various times direct
or indirect goals of public policy (Helleiner, 1999). In this sense, the Civil
War, with its massive fiscal requirements, represented a watershed mo-
ment. Financing the war produced a series of legislative acts with the
goal of establishing a national banking system with a national note, which
was backed by federal bonds. However, national banking acts were not
the sole cause of the watershed. The massive asset emissions during the
Civil War produced a common and portable means of settlement, and thus
consolidated the payments system, even before the national banking acts
were passed (Weiman & James, 2007). Thus, the fiscal-military state pro-
duced strong and deliberate policy directed at creating a national currency
system.
A similar process was at work during the European era of state building.
Far from the natural outcome of markets, they were instead the result of
“painstaking and deliberate activities of public authorities” (Zelizer, 1994,
p. 205). Cohen (1998) suggests that the advantage of establishing ter-
ritorial currencies to the state building project was four-fold. Territorial
currencies promoted national unity (as a symbol), contributed to public
revenue, allowed macroeconomic stabilization policy, and protected states
from foreign coercion.
Prior to the establishment of these currencies, which was a long and
unsteady process, private monies freely moved across national borders
without issue (Rochon & Vernengo, 2003). Goodhart (1998) notes that es-
tablishing monetary sovereignty in which the state’s money is at the top
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of the hierarchy of money implies a relation between the powers of fis-
cal policy and money creation. This relation runs both ways. As already
mentioned, monetary sovereignty implies the ability to engage in fiscal sta-
bilization policy. However, equally important, a substantial tax structure
must be in place before a nation can hope to establish national money as
the unit of account. Even then, the process can take time and requires
removal of foreign currencies, the standardization of paper notes, the cre-
ation of domestic financial institutions, and a host of other active policies
(Helleiner, 1999).
A degree of instability can thus result from internal as well as exter-
nal exchange rates. Cross border currency competition has been a fea-
ture of economic life for most of modern history. States that were able to
slowly take control of currency and establish national monies found them-
selves able to build domestic markets, and to establish dominance interna-
tionally through the control of trade routes, and financial expansion that
forced other territorial currencies into submission. Thus, Kirshner (1997,
p. 29) argues, “monetary power is a remarkably efficient component of
state power... the most potent instrument of economic coercion available
to states in a position to exercise it.”
Conclusion
The consequences of the expansion of US fiscal powers would be difficult
to overstate. It was, in fact, central to overcoming one of the major forces
behind the balance of payments constraint, namely the denomination of
external debt. Indeed, the federal government escaped original sin very
early on with its external debt denominated primarily in dollars by the be-
ginning of the 19th century (Bordo, Meissner, & Redish, 2003). Of course
42
at various times, the U.S. government’s promise to pay was explicitly or
implicitly fixed in gold. State debts did, however, tend to be denominated
in sterling prior to 1840, and occasionally thereafter as Wilkins (2004)
notes. Wilkins also finds that private companies issued debt in foreign
markets in sterling until late in the century. On the whole however, Bordo
et al. argue that, “since the 1850s, all players in the economy were able to
issue debt denominated in U.S. dollars... that nonresidents were willing
to hold.” Thus, though it may not have achieved key currency status until
the interwar period, the financial dependence that characterized early U.S.
growth was significantly decreased, though not eliminated, by the end of
the century. It was WWI that transformed the U.S. into a creditor in inter-
national capital markets, but the institutional framework laid by Hamilton
and the federalists set the stage.
The developmental role of the state evolved along very different lines in
Latin America, however. Furtado (1968) argues that this difference was re-
flected in the economic policies advocated by Alexander Hamilton and the
Viscount of Cairú, José da Silva Lisboa, claiming each were representative
of the ruling classes.33 Hamilton lobbied for industrial policy while Cairú
pursued free trade, reflecting the export interests of large-scale farmers.
To this story, Vernengo (2006) adds the role of public finance, as Cairú
made no attempts at establishing national credit. The absence of a strong
fiscal state was not for lack of military conflict. As Centeno (1997) argues,
the traditional story of war promoting state development does not apply to
Latin America. Despite a variety of internal and external military conflicts,
no fiscal state was produced because, as Centeno demonstrates, there was
a lack of establishment of prior political authority.
33This is perhaps granting Hamilton a dominance in early U.S. politics that he did not
necessarily have.
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As Helleiner (1999) points out, national monetary reforms happened at
the pace of the broader political project of state building. Thus, the slower
pace and incomplete results of some of the former Spanish and Portuguese
colonies reflect the degree to which these nations had an interest in state
building. Mexico, for instance, only accomplished many of the necessary
reforms after the turn of the century, driven by the postrevolutionary state.
Thus, the ambitious internal projects of the Cardenas government gen-
erated fiscal requirements that eventually led to a monopoly over paper
notes. It was under the Cardenas government as well that the central
bank gained regulatory powers and the ability to manage the exchange
rate (Maxfield, 1990).
The U.S., however, had established the basic components of a modern
financial system soon after the Revolution. Sylla (2001) claims that the re-
sulting ability to rely on domestic financial markets for funding public debt
was a “key difference between the United States and most other countries
of the New World” (p. 246).
The roots of the nondevelopmental features of many Latin American
states may be traced back to the colonial experience and the lack of a
national bourgeoisie, as argued by Cardoso and Faletto (1979). It is likely
also related to the way in which the nation states earned their indepen-
dence. In contrast, Egnal (1975) has argued that the U.S. Revolutionary
War was a consequence of external events that threatened the economic
independence of a colonial merchant class. Thus, while the U.S. revolu-
tion was marked by a drive for economic independence, Landes (1999) has
argued that it was essentially Spanish and Portuguese weakness at home
that produced revolution in Latin America. Additionally, external funding
for U.S. independence came partially in the form of loans but also in the
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form of outright transfers from the French, who had significant interest in
seeing the British defeated. The funding of Latin American independence,
by contrast, marked the first large wave of sovereign lending and defaults
in world history (Dawson, 1990).
We thus see that the major contrast between the former North and South
American colonies has been in terms of the fiscal powers of the state and
financial development which is rooted in their respective colonial experi-
ences. If this is the case, the notion of the liberal state as the main driver of
economic history should be replaced. Additionally, it could be argued that
modern policy recommendations that emphasize independent institutions
and the absence of state intervention rely essentially on historical myths.
CHAPTER 3
FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER
Introduction
Between the Revolutionary War and the close of the 19th century, the
United States went through major economic transformation that propelled
it from a relatively small economy on the periphery amidst large European
powers to the dominant manufacturer in the world. The sources of this
economic growth given by most economic historians reference the devel-
opment of supply side factors. The savings preferences of the community,
the growth of population, the expansion of natural resources, and the ad-
vancement of technology are then generally argued to determine the pace
of output growth.
However, an alternative view of growth, the “Keynesian hypothesis,” sees
aggregate demand as the source of growth not only in the short-run, but
in the long run as well (Garegnani & Palumbo, 1999). That is, in the long
run, savings are generated by income growth, but do not determine it.
Growth is then determined by the level of autonomous spending over the
long period. Though Keynes himself dealt with the principle of effective
demand primarily in the short period, Nicholas Kaldor (1966) worked to
extend the principle to the long period where the process of accumulation
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results in changes the productive capacity of the economy.1 In Kaldor’s
extension, he suggests that the level of effective demand required for full
employment may be at odds with equilibrium in the balance of payments.2
The structure of production of a country may generate a tendency toward
trade imbalances that cannot be financed indefinitely. In what follows, we
argue that the position of the United States in international trade and fi-
nance meant that for much of the 19th century, its growth was checked by
external constraints on demand and not by the long run growth of factor
supplies or technology. British monetary hegemony after the end of the
Napoleonic wars meant that the adjustment of the balance of payments
was asymmetric throughout the period. While the British learned to man-
age capital flows (and thus the balance of payments) through the Bank of
England’s monetary policy, the U.S., with no strong monetary authority,
and a currency that had not achieved reserve status, was not so fortunate.
However, as the century drew to a close, the internal development of in-
dustry and financial markets enabled the U.S. to reduce and eventually
eliminate the balance of payments constraint.
In what follows, the hypothesis that the balance of payments acted as
a constraint on domestic growth is explicitly tested. First, we establish
the lack of a role for trade in traditional stories about U.S. growth over
the 19th century. This is primarily the result of a focus on the supply
side determinants of growth. Next, the balance of payments constraint is
1The literature extending Keynes to the long run begins with Harrod’s (1939) seminal
contribution.
2Kaldor, in his early work, primarily worked under the assumption of full employment.
Camara-Neto and Vernengo (2010) have suggested that Kaldor’s shift toward a de-
mand led growth model may have been influenced by the decline of the pound as an
international reserve currency which resulted in balance of payments problems. It is
worth noting that in this paper, we examine the opposite movement for the United
States, that is, the development from a peripheral country to a central one with a
reserve currency.
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formalized along the lines suggested by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994).
The requisite import elasticities are estimated in both the short and long
run. We conclude by noting that the balance of payments predicted growth
rate is a remarkably accurate predictor of actual growth. In addition, the
external constraint fell after the Civil War as a result of a decline in the
income sensitivity of imports.
Supply, Demand, and Trade in Economic History
The role of trade in the rapid economic transformation of the United
States in the 19th century was for a time among the central issues of
economic history. In particular, D. North (1961) famously argued for the
central importance of external trade and inter-regional trade in U.S. eco-
nomic growth. Thus, in the antebellum period at least, cotton was king
and drove internal expansion.3 Very soon after, however, the notion that
exports could lead growth came under criticism. Kravis (1972), Goldin and
Lewis (1980), and others have argued that due to the relative small size of
the external sector to GDP, it could not be of major influence.4 Lindstrom
(1983) has argued that the external view of growth in the 19th century sug-
gests that resources would have been underutilized otherwise, a proposi-
tion she summarily rejects. She concludes that, “Demand-oriented models
falter when they attempt to explain long run growth...” The replacement
of the earlier models emphasizing the external sector came on the heels of
Solow’s famous growth decomposition.5
3This has much in common with the so-called “staple” theory of early growth made
popular by Harold Innis in the Canadian context. See for example, Innis (1967).
4Engerman (1977) review of the research since North’s book suggested that while it
posed interesting questions, the main thesis of export led growth had fallen out of
favor.
5It is also around this time that the demand view of the industrial revolution, famously
argued by Gilboy (1967) and then Landes (1969) and Deane (1979), came under fire.
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As Crafts (2009) has argued, the growth accounting approach has dom-
inated much of the thinking about long run economic growth in economic
history since.6 Growth decompositions have suggested that growth was
primarily attributable to the expansion of labor and capital supplies, with
a smaller role for total factor productivity than in the modern period.7 The
supply side vision of growth thus leaves little room for the role of interna-
tional trade. As Lipsey (2000) argues, “A view of the economy as governed
by some type of economy-wide production function in which inputs of fac-
tors of production lead to predictable outputs of product tends to find little
room for any influence of trade.”
Indeed, standard macroeconomic theory has restored the Wicksellian
postulate of the natural rate of interest, adding to that the notion of a nat-
ural rate of unemployment. In the long run then, forces are brought about
that restore the rate of interest and the rate of unemployment to their nat-
ural level. That is, in the long run, it is supposed that demand adjusts to
the natural capacity of the economy. It should be clear, then, that extend-
ing the principle of effective demand to the long run involves first rejecting
the notion of an exogenous natural capacity determined by the growth of
factor supplies and the (exogenous) rate of technological progress. The
movements of labor both internationally and regionally, the responsive-
ness of investment to the accelerator mechanism, and westward land ex-
pansion suggest that it may be inappropriate to characterize growth in the
19th century as deriving from exogenous factor growth. As Irwin (2002), in
reference to the 19th century, argues, “factors such as capital investment
or population growth are apt to be endogenous and not exogenous deter-
See Mokyr (1977) for a review of the debate on the relative importance of supply and
demand forces in the industrial revolution.
6See for instance, Abramovitz and David (2001).
7See for instance, Atack and Passell (1994)
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minants of growth.” We may add that the responsiveness of productivity
to output growth (or what has come to be called Verdoorn’s law) and the
existence of “learning by doing” suggest that we may also be skeptical of
an exogenous rate of technological progress.
In addition, international trade is often seen as following the rules of
comparative advantage and the price-specie flow mechanism. Modern
views of the international monetary system during the 19th century tend to
see adjustments to the balance of as occurring relatively smoothly through
the price mechanism, and an international division of labor that is de-
termined by resource endowments. Indeed, Eichengreen (1998) argues
for what can be seen as a version David Hume’s price-specie-flow mech-
anism. To the classical price-specie-flow mechanism, Eichengreen adds
international capital flows and a central bank that can make interest rate
adjustments. This reflects the observation that actual gold flows were in-
consistent with Hume’s model, and capital flows were perhaps even more
important than trade flows. Thus, during the classical gold standard, ad-
justing monetary policy (and keeping public debt in line) in order to main-
tain the parity with gold (or a currency tied to gold) becomes the “rules of
the game.” However, the fundamental mechanism of adjustment remains
essentially the same as Hume’s original argument.
However, as pointed out by De Cecco (1974) among others, when it
comes to external finance, not all countries are created equal. For some
countries, adjustment to payments imbalances required large income move-
ments, while in others, the any payments problems could be solved by
small adjustments in monetary policy. The international financial system
can then be seen as resting on a center-periphery divide. England sup-
plied long-term capital to the rest of the world, which returned to England
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in the form of demand for exports and short-term capital through adjust-
ments in the discount rate. In addition, international capital flows were
often destabilizing, particularly for the periphery. Thus, adjustments to
payments imbalances were achieved through income changes via the Har-
rodian trade multiplier.
For much of the 19th century, the British were able to settle their chronic
balance of payments deficits in sterling. That is, short-term inflows al-
lowed a permanent deficit on goods, and long-term outflows.8 Though it
could be said that the British only adopt a gold standard after the passage
of Robert Peel’s Act of 1844, the sterling bill was effectively an interna-
tional currency prior to this. In addition, Hawtrey (1965) argues that the
discount rate of the Bank of England began to be used as a tool of mon-
etary regulation after the Bank Charter Act of 1833.9 The expansion of
British debt during the Napoleonic Wars (to around 250% of GDP) led to
a growth in the size of financial markets, so that not only were consols
widely traded, but other private bonds and equities found a larger number
of buyers. In addition, the Rothschild, flush from earnings on Napoleonic
war consols, began to impose a requirement that foreign borrowers borrow
in sterling, and make interest payments in London Ferguson (2008).
It is no surprise, then, that the first wave of Latin American sovereign
defaults occurs in the 1820s as British capital finds itself in the busi-
ness of floating loans on behalf of foreign governments (Dawson, 1990).
8Short-term inflows result from peripheral surplus countries that invest in short-term
British assets rather than accumulating gold. In addition, nonfactor services, invest-
ment income, and trade within the empire (particularly India) all play a role. See
De Cecco (1974) on the role of short-term inflows and the role of trade within the em-
pire during the classic gold standard. See Esteban (2001) on the role of India in the
earlier part of the century. Baghestani and Mott (2009) estimate the long run quantity
equation for Britain during the gold standard, and suggest the error correction terms
reflect British management of gold reserves.
9Hawtrey (1965) argues that the notion of using the discount rate as a policy instrument
originated with Henry Thornton 30 years earlier.
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But of course, it is just a decade later that several U.S. states default on
their external obligations, which were primarily owed to British banking
houses. The dominance of sterling in international transactions meant
also that the British were able to finance trade deficits without the prob-
lem of mounting external debts in foreign currency, sometimes called the
problem of “original sin.”10
The role of sterling in international finance led to a stylized cycle between
England and peripheral nations. Long waves of increasing external debt
and subsequent default among peripheral countries began in the 1820s
and continued throughout the 19th century. In each wave, the British
were the primary lenders Suter (1992). Though the details differ, a pattern
emerges in which rising commodity prices (coinciding with faster British
growth) result in imported inflation, which then results in a sharp increase
in British discount rates. This caused a decline in peripheral commodity
prices through demand effects, exchange rate effects and liquidation of
commodity stocks by merchants. The capital flight back to Britain also
caused a decline in expenditures in the periphery, and would very of-
ten prompt defensive interest rate increases. With high interest rates,
falling incomes, and low export prices, debt commitments in the periphery
quickly became unsustainable.
The United States had not yet achieved “key” currency status during
this period, and was thus vulnerable to the instability of capital flows. In
addition, for at least the antebellum period, U.S. exports were dominated
by a single commodity export, cotton. It was thus subject to persistent
trade deficits, which it was not always able to finance with capital inflows.
A reduction of imports through a reduction in income was then often the
10See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)
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result.
The Harrodian adjustment to external imbalances then fits with the view
of the international financial system as being characterized by a center
and periphery. The income adjustment mechanism just described has
been revived by Thirlwall (1979), who argues that for many countries, the
rate of growth consistent with balance of payments equilibrium may be
less than the rate consistent with full utilization of resources. In what
follows, we explicitly test the balance of payments constraint hypothesis
(sometimes known as Thirlwall’s law) for the U.S. over the 19th century.
The Balance of Payments Constraint
As discussed, the view of the 19th century as being characterized by
a center-periphery dichotomy suggests that for the U.S., the expansion
of domestic demand may lead to balance of payments difficulties before
growth reaches its short-term capacity limit. Exports then take on a par-
ticularly important role, as the sole source of demand that does not cause
balance of payments deterioration. The constraint can be derived quite
simply from the balance of payments equilibrium.
Consider a country whose balance of payments is in equilibrium:
P dX = EP fM (3.1)
where P d is the price of exports, X is the quantity of exports, E is the
nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency), P f is the price
of imports in foreign currency, and M is the quantity of imports. Log
differentiation yields the growth rates:
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pd + x = e+ pf +m (3.2)
The growth rate of GDP consistent with balance of equilibrium can be









)ηZ; η < 0,  > 0 (3.4)
where a and b are constants, ψ and η are price elasticities, pi and  are
income elasticities, and Z is world income. Price elasticities are negative,
and income elasticities positive. In growth form, equations (3.3) and (3.4)
become:
m = ψ(pf + e− pd) + piy (3.5)
x = η(pd − pf − e) + z (3.6)
Substituting equation (3.5) and equation (3.6) into equation (3.2) yields the
rate of growth consistent with balance of payments equilibrium:
yb =
(1 + η + ψ)(pd − pf − e) + z
pi
(3.7)
The standard version of Thirlwall’s law assumes that in the long run,
capital flows are zero and relative prices in domestic currency (pd − pf − e)
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The above suggests that the primary sources of growth for a balance
of payments constrained country are a reduction in the income elasticity
of imports (perhaps through the development of import competing indus-
tries), or improved export performance.
For some countries, a stable level of capital inflows may allow it to grow
faster than the rate of growth suggested by equation (3.8), even in the
long run. To deal with this possibility, several authors have developed
augmented versions of Thirlwall’s law to allow for capital flows. Thirlwall
and Hussain (1982) extended the model to allow for unlimited foreign cap-
ital flows. Moreno-Brid (1999) extended the model to restrict the implied
growth rate to a level consistent with sustainable growth of foreign debt.
More recently, Moreno-Brid (2003) has incorporated foreign interest pay-
ments.
Following Britto and McCombie (2009), if capital flows are allowed for,
the dynamic balance of payments identity described in equation (3.2) be-
comes:
θ1(p
d + x)− θ2(pd + i) + (1− θ1 + θ2)(pd + f) = e+ pf +m (3.9)
where i is the growth of real net interest payments, and f is growth of the
net inflow of capital. In addition, θ1 and θ2 reflect the proportion of exports
11This is in contrast to other theories of the balance of payments that emphasize exchange
rate and relative price adjustments.
12This reduction is also the case if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds exactly (i.e., 1+η+
ψ = 0). As pointed out by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994), equation (3.8) is a dynamic
version of the classic Harrod foreign trade multiplier.
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covered by imports and the proportion of interest payments covered by
imports, respectively. To prevent explosive growth of external debt relative
to GDP, the following condition is imposed:
f = y (3.10)
The resulting balance of payments constrained growth rate is:
yb =
(1 + θ1η + ψ)(p
d − pf − e) + θ1z − θ2i
pi − (1− θ1 + θ2) (3.11)
If relative prices are again assumed constant:
yb =
θ1x− θ2i
pi − (1− θ1 + θ2) (3.12)
The version of Thirlwall’s law in equation (3.12) suggests that the balance
of payments may be improved by improvement in export growth and import
propensities as before, but it adds the decrease in net interest payments.
Of course, the interest burden may be out of the control of domestic policy
makers, particularly if the debt is denominated in foreign currency. In the
next section, we will see how well the various versions of Thirlwall’s law fit
the U.S. growth experience.
Testing the balance of payments constraint can be done in several ways.
Most work relies on two methods.13 First, equation (3.7) is directly esti-
mated. A significant coefficient on the growth of foreign income and a zero
or insignificant coefficient on relative prices will confirm Thirlwall’s law. A
second method first estimates the income elasticity of imports, and then
tests how well the growth rate implied by equation (3.8) matches the ac-
tual growth rate. This can be done either by examining whether the actual
13McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) summarize the empirical work.
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growth rate of GDP is significantly different than the balance of payments
constrained growth rate, or by testing whether the actual and implied in-
come elasticities of imports are significantly different.
In this paper, given the long run nature of our study, we opt for the latter
method. Import functions for the U.S. are estimated over the century using
the ARDL approach to cointegration, as described by Pesaran, Shin, and
Smith (2001). The income elasticity of imports is then tested against the
elasticity implied by both the standard version of Thirlwall’s law, and the
version allowing for capital flows.
The Data
As with many historical time series, the data used here become less reli-
able the further one goes back in time. Of the data used in this study, the
estimates for GDP are likely the least reliable. The prospective econometri-
cian is warned against placing much faith in the short-term fluctuations
of GDP estimates prior to 1929. Instead, it is generally accepted that these
estimates indicate the “pace and pattern” of economic growth rather than
its short-run changes (Sutch, 2006b). The purpose of this study is to
generate rough approximations of the relationship between the balance of
payments and economic growth during the 19th century, and the extent
to which the implied relationships change over long periods. We may be
concerned about the quality of GDP data, but we can also take comfort in
not relying heavily on annual fluctuations.
The estimation of GDP prior to 1929 has been somewhat contentious.
For our purposes, it would be inappropriate to review all the creative meth-
ods of estimating GDP for the 19th century here.14 The long run series
14A nice summary of these efforts can be found in Rhode and Sutch (2006).
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used in this paper is the “millennial estimates” series from the Cambridge
Historical Statistics.15 This series combines the David (1967) and Weiss
(1992) estimates for the antebellum period, and the so-called “standard”
series for the postbellum period.16
Four sets of import price indices are available for the period under con-
sideration. In North’s (1961) seminal work, he calculates two sets of import
price indices. One covers the years 1790 to 1815, the second from 1815
until 1860. Simon (1960), seeking to extend North’s work, and using the
same methodology, computes an import price index for the years 1861
to 1879. Finally, Lipsey (1963) calculates an import price index between
1879 and 1929. We construct a rough series for real imports between 1800
and 1900 using North, Simon, and Lipsey’s series. The three price series
were combined, and the base year was set at 1860. An export price index
was constructed similarly. In addition, data on exports and imports are
derived from the same sources, as compiled by Edelstein (2006).
As with the trade price indices, no single domestic price series over-
whelmingly lends itself to our purpose. Often, the implicit price deflator
is used in estimations of import demand functions. Ideally, one would
use an index of the prices of domestic substitutes for foreign goods. This,
of course, is quite difficult. Perhaps the most heavily relied on domes-
tic price index for the antebellum period is the Warren (1932) index of
wholesale prices. It is often used as a general indicator for prices in the
antebellum period. Indeed, the David and Solar (1977) cost of living index
makes use of the Warren series (among others) weighted by estimates of
household expenditures. Johnston and Williamson (2007) construct an
15Table Ca9 in Sutch (2006a).
16The “standard” series, so named by Balke and Gordon (1989), is commonly used and
has held up relatively well to new methods of estimation.
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implicit GDP deflator using benchmark years, interpolating the years in
between with David and Solar’s series. To construct relative prices, we
use the David and Solar series, as the weighting for household expendi-
tures is relevant considering a good portion of imports were for domestic
consumption throughout the 19th century.
J. G. Williamson (1964) has argued for long waves of about 15 years or
so in the balance of payments that roughly coincide with domestic long
swings. The cycles that Williamson notes can clearly be seen in our data.
In the following sections, we will examine the causality among these series
from a balance of payments constraint perspective. Table 3.1 summarizes
the peaks and troughs indicated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
A few things can be noted from Table 3.1. The first is that long swings in
the goods balance seem to last about 10 years from peak to trough, and in
general seem to be driven by fluctuations in imports. Imports and exports
seem to move together prior to the 1870s, but the amplitude of import
fluctuations dominates movements in exports.
Table 3.1: Long Run Peaks and Troughs in GDP, Imports and Exports
Imports Exports GDP
1825 (trough) 1832 (trough) -
1832 (peak) - 1830 (peak)
1839 (trough) - 1839-40 (trough)
1848 (peak) 1851 (peak) 1851-53 (peak)
1860-61 (trough) 1861 (trough) 1866 (trough)
1869 (peak) 1872 (peak) -
1876 (trough) - -
1882 (peak) 1883-84 (trough) 1879 (peak)
1895 (trough) 1896-97 (peak) 1892 (trough)
Sources: See text. Timing of long cycles is derived from a Hodrick-Prescott filter
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In addition, these movements seem to be associated with changes in
GDP growth rates. That is, faster GDP growth, growth in exports, and
growth in imports all seem to coincide. After 1870, this relationship breaks
down as GDP now moves against exports and with imports.
Terms of trade movements over the 19th century show a similar pattern,
as can be seen in the plot of the filtered long run and short term cyclical se-
ries in Figure 3.1. Prior to 1870, rapid increases in the terms of trade are
associated with faster growth, and a deteriorating balance of payments.
Large negative shocks seem to coincide with balance of payments correc-
tion and slow GDP growth. After 1870, the amplitude of shocks is much
smaller compared with previous years, though cycles can still be detected
in the mid-1870s and mid-1880s that roughly precede recessions.
Figure 3.1: Hodrick Prescott Filter of the Terms of Trade Series
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Estimates of 19th-Century Trade Elasticities
Before estimating the import demand function, we need to first investi-
gate the properties of our time series variables. Since at least C. Nelson
and Plosser (1982), it has been common for researchers to examine the
stationarity of time series to avoid spurious results. In order to identify
unit roots in the data, we perform augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests on
the variables and their first differences. The results, presented in Table
3.2, suggest that our data are nonstationary in levels, but stationary in
first differences.
However, ADF tests potentially confuse structural breaks in the series
as evidence of nonstationarity. Though a host of tests exist to test for
unit roots in the face of structural breaks, a particularly useful approach
is that developed by Clemente, Montañes, and Reyes (1998). These tests,
based on Perron and Vogelsang (1992), allow up to two unknown struc-
tural breaks in the mean of the series. In addition, both of the tests (for
one and two structural breaks) allow for sudden breaks in the mean (ad-
ditive outliers) and gradual shifts in the mean (innovational outliers).
Table 3.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Roots
Variable Constant No Constant Trend and Constant Judgment
y -0.527 7.79 -3.049 I(1)
4y -9.921*** -5.066*** -9.883*** I(0)
imt -0.399 2.593 -3.25* I(1)
4im -5.244*** -4.208*** -5.226*** I(0)
dsrp -2.95 -0.697 -3.249 I(1)
4dsrp -7.174*** -7.175*** -7.159*** I(0)
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The null in a ADF test is that the variable has a unit root. Lags were suggested by AIC
and SBIC.
61
The results of the unitroot tests in the face of structuralbreaks are pre-
sented in Table 3.3. The presence of structural breaks is detected for all
variables, and unsurprisingly, the dates of endogenously chosen struc-
tural breaks mostly coincide with the Civil War. However, we still cannot
reject the presence of a unit root for GDP and imports. The original rejec-
tion of the stationarity of relative prices, however, is called into question.
To proceed with further estimation, we need to examine the potential
long run cointegrating relationship. If we were sure that all the variables
were I(1), the standard Johansen (1991) approach to cointegration would
be appropriate. Given the doubt introduced by the above unit root tests,
we should be wary about proceeding in this fashion. An alternative ap-
proach developed by Pesaran et al. (2001), based on an autoregressive dis-
tributed lag (ARDL) model, allows the testing of cointegrating relationships
in the face of variables with mixed orders of integration.
Indeed, this approach has been increasingly common in the estimation
of import demand functions.17 The ARDL approach has other desirable
properties as well. In general, it can deal better with small sample bias,
which is important as our data is annual, and allows flexibility in the lag
structure of dependent variables (as opposed to cointegration VAR models).
The ARDL model involves estimating the following equation by OLS:












In the above, βs can be interpreted as long run multipliers, and the θs
can be interpreted as reflecting the short-run dynamics. The lag structure
is indicated by l and q. Following the estimation of equation (3.13), an
17See for instance Narayan and Narayan (2005), Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2004),
or Ghosh (2009).
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Table 3.3: Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Tests for Unit Roots
Single Break
Additive Outliers Innovational Outliers
Variable t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat
y 14.80*** -1.99 1.438 -1.212
4y 0.12 -6.13** -0.84 -11.93**
imt 17.67*** -1.77 1.96* -1.89
4im 0.67 -7.09** 1.30 -10.39**
dsrp -7.67*** -3.45 -3.59*** -4.283**
4dsrp -0.01 -3.17 1.167 -4.546**
Double Break
Additive Outliers Innovational Outliers
Variable t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat
y 15.41*** 12.12*** -2.88 1.98** 1.52 -1.95
4y 2.70*** -2.87*** -9.97** 3.31*** -3.67*** -8.87**
imt 12.02*** 11.41*** -2.286 5.16*** 1.63 -2.65
4im 0.68 -0.143 -6.74** 6.03*** -5.25*** -13.66**
dsrp -7.16*** 3.59*** -4.52 -5.70*** 4.68*** -5.83**
4dsrp -5.80*** 6.05*** -5.68** -5.52*** 5.86*** -6.66**
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
F -statistic is calculated, testing the joint hypothesis that the coefficients
on all lagged level variables are equal to zero:
H0 = βj = 0, j = 1, ..., k (3.14)
Ha = β1 6= 0 j = 1, ..., k
However, under the null hypothesis presented above, the asymptotic dis-
tributions of the Wald statistics are nonstandard. Instead, the F -statistic
is compared to the critical values presented in Pesaran et al. (2001), who
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provide two sets of values, that provide the bounds.18 If the F -statistic lies
outside the bounds, the null can be rejected, and a cointegrating relation-
ship exists. If a cointegrating relation is identified, the long run cointegrat-
ing vector can be extracted and an error correction model estimated.
Thus, we will proceed with cointegration tests using the ARDL bounds
procedure. The ARDL model for import demand is estimated as follows:










We then estimate equation (3.13) for our data between 1815 and 1900.19
The lag structure is determined by minimizing the Schwartz criteria, as
suggested by Pesaran et al. The calculated F -statistic and the relevant
critical values are presented in Table 3.4 under various assumptions about
the trend and intercept. The F -statistic lies well outside the bounds at the
1% level for all cases, and therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration
can be rejected.
After establishing a cointegrating relation, we are free to estimate the
long run cointegrating equation and short-run dynamics. The results are
Table 3.4: The ARDL Bounds Test for Cointegration in Import Demand
Calculated F-statistic
Case 1 no intercept, no trend 6.12***
Case 2 intercept, no trend 40.57***
Case 3 intercept, trend 26.00***
The critical value bounds are taken from Pesaran et al. (2001).
18One set assumes all variables are I(1) and the other assumes that all variables are I(0).
19The date of 1815 was indicated by structural break tests. It also marks the defeat of
Napoleon and the end of the War of 1812, which restored some degree of normality to
international trade relations.
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presented in Table 3.5. Case 1, although it yielded a long run cointegrat-
ing relation, was dropped as it is unrealistic and did not perform well.
Extracting the long run cointegration relationship by normalizing on im-
ports yields the following long run relationships for the equation with and
without a trend, respectively:
mt = 0.89yt − 0.55rpt (3.16)
mt = 2.52yt − 0.68rpt (3.17)
While imports are most certainly inelastic with respect to prices, the
income elasticity seems to vary quite a bit depending on the assumption
about the underlying time trend. In addition, the short-run dynamics
suggest that relative prices play a smaller role than income in adjusting to
long run equilibrium.
Diagnostic tests suggest no problems of serial correlation, nonnormal-
ity, ARCH effects, or misspecification. Given the presence of structural
breaks in the underlying data, however, we should be particularly wary
about the stability of the parameters. The plots of the cumulative sum of
recursive residuals and the cumulative sum of squared recursive residuals
(the CUMSUM and CUMSUMSQ tests) in Figure 3.2 suggest that the pa-
rameters of the long run equation are relatively stable. A Quandt-Andrews
test for an unknown break point (not reported here) suggests that there is
indeed a break point around 1862, which is unsurprising.
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Table 3.5: ARDL Estimates of the Import Demand Function 1815-1900
Dependent Variable: D(m)






















Adjusted R-Squared 0.61 0.66
*,**,*** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in brackets.
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Figure 3.2: CUMSUM and CUMSUMSQ Tests 1815-1900
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In order to avoid the problems of a possible structural break, the long
run relationship was re-estimated for the antebellum and postbellum peri-
ods. The results of the short period regressions are presented in Table 3.6.
Lags were again selected so as to minimize the Schwartz criterion. For the
antebellum period, the following long run relationships were found:
mt = 1.26yt + 0.77rpt (3.18)
mt = 3.30yt − 0.39rpt (3.19)
For the postbellum period, the import demand functions are:
mt = 0.78yt − 1.19rpt (3.20)
mt = 2.05yt − 1.43rpt (3.21)
Equations (3.18) and (3.20) reflect the long run relationship estimated
without a deterministic trend, while equations (3.19) and (3.21) reflect the
relationship estimated with a trend.
Before using these elasticities to test the appropriateness of Thirlwall’s
law for the 19th-century U.S., a few comments on the cointegrating re-
lationships are in order. The two periods are associated with somewhat
different import demand functions. In the first half of the century, imports
appear to be much more income sensitive and much less price sensitive.
The coefficient on relative prices even takes on the wrong sign in equation
(3.18). This is in some sense different from the common understanding of
the operation of the balance of payments in the antebellum period.
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Table 3.6: The Antebellum and Postbellum Import Demand Function
Dependent Variable: D(m)
Antebellum (1815 - 1861) Postbellum (1866-1900)
No Trend Trend No Trend Trend
mt-1 -0.88*** -0.98*** -0.41** -0.39**
[0.07] [0.10] [0.16] [0.16]
yt-1 1.11*** 3.23*** 0.32** 0.80**
[0.11] [0.52] [0.15] [0.37]
rpt-1 0.68* -0.38 -0.49*** -0.56***
[0.36] [0.38] [0.17] [0.18]
D(m)t-1 0.18** 0.34*** -0.08 -0.15





D(y)t 1.99** 2.78*** 0.76* 0.95**
[0.80] [0.73] [0.40] [0.42]
D(y)t-1 0.40 -1.35* 0.33 0.21





D(rp)t 0.43 -0.12 -1.37*** -1.29***
[0.44] [0.40] [0.37] [0.36]
D(rp)t-1 0.08 -0.04 -0.39 -0.37




[1.16] [4.50] [1.54] [3.41]
Trend -0.09*** -0.02
[0.02] [0.01]
R 0.85 0.89 0.70 0.72
Adj. R 0.81 0.86 0.61 0.62
*,**,*** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in brackets.
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For instance, Temin (1969) has suggested that in the antebellum period,
“prices were flexible, they could vary to facilitate capital transfers, and
they could change radically without destroying the ability of the economy
to operate near capacity.” The above equations suggest a Keynesian ad-
justment, with imports far more sensitive to income than relative prices.
Thus, quite large shifts in relative prices would be required to bring im-
ports in line with exports.
In the latter half of the century, imports become price elastic, and less
income elastic. The decline in income elasticity and rise in price elasticity
likely reflects the availability of domestic alternatives - that is, it reflects
the substitution of imports. We will say more on the trend in elasticities in
a later section, but the contrary movement of income and price elasticities
over the 19th century should be clear. In what follows, we will test Thirl-
wall’s law against the elasticity estimates provided in this section.
The Performance of Thirlwall’s Law
To test the presence of a binding balance of payments constraint, we will
compare our estimates of income elasticities to those predicted by Thirl-
wall’s law in both its basic and extended versions. Table 3.7 presents the
results. The growth of real net interest payments is proxied by the growth
of payments on foreign assets from the Cambridge Historical Statistics, di-
vided by our price index.20 The growth of payments on foreign assets for
our period is itself an estimate, derived by applying an estimated interested
rate to the stock of foreign assets in the U.S.
The variables pi ,y,i, and x represent the income elasticity of imports and
the growth rates of real GDP, real foreign payments, and real exports, re-
20Table Ee9 in Edelstein (2006)
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Table 3.7: Predicted and Actual Elasticities of Imports and Growth Rates
1815-1900 1815-1861 1866-1900
pinotrend 0.89 1.26 0.78
pitrend 2.52 3.30 2.05
pia 2.56 3.43 1.79
pib 2.57 3.14 1.89
ya,notrend 11.68 10.82 9.11
ya,trend 4.13 4.14 3.47
yb,notrend 9.54 10.65 9.23
yb,trend 4.14 3.78 3.67
yactual 4.06 3.97 4.17
θ1 1.04 0.92 1.21
θ2 0.10 0.06 0.15
i 6.38 7.76 5.67
x 10.4 13.63 7.11
spectively. The variables θ1 and θ2 are the export to import ratio and the
foreign payments to imports ratio. The subscripts a and b indicate the ver-
sion of the balance of payments constraint without and with capital flows.
The subscripts trend and notrend indicated whether the income elasticity
was estimated with a deterministic time trend or not.
The balance of payments constraint model in both of its forms performs
remarkably well. Clearly, the estimates derived with a deterministic time
trend give more reasonable results. Formal Wald tests on coefficient re-
strictions for the trend estimates suggest that neither the standard nor the
capital augmented versions of the balance of payments constraint can be
rejected. During the 19th century, the U.S. faced income adjustments to
balance its foreign payments, which constrained its rate of growth.
The results imply that a higher rate of growth in the postbellum period
was allowed only because of a sharp reduction in the propensity to import.
That is, with a much lower rate of export growth, the U.S. would have
had persistent balance of payments problems in the postbellum period
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had it not substituted away from imports. In addition, as we shall note
momentarily, the growth of foreign payments was of a different nature, and
this implied that the instability of foreign capital played less of a threat.
Finally, mention should be made of the role of relative prices and the
terms of trade during this period. As we noted earlier, the hypothesis
suggested by McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) that relative prices play little
role in import demand is confirmed. This implies a Keynesian adjustment
on the balance of payments. When large current account deficits emerged,
and foreign capital dried up, a collapse in domestic demand followed that
reduced import demand. Import prices declined relative to domestic prices
throughout the century, and particularly drastic was the decline during
the Civil War years. To the extent to which export prices grew, the terms
of trade improved, although after 1840 the trend is negligible. What is
more noticeable in the terms of trade is the absence of major terms of
trade shocks after the Civil War, as noted earlier. On the whole, however,
it seems clear that price adjustments could hardly play the primary role in
correcting foreign payments imbalances.
The evidence of income as the primary adjustment mechanism to exter-
nal imbalances seems clear enough. As noted earlier, this was not neces-
sarily the case for England, who was able to force some of the adjustment
onto the periphery.21 Over the 19th century, as we have seen, the U.S.
was able to reduce its propensity to import. In addition, towards the end
of the century, economic actors in the U.S. were increasingly able to issue
foreign debt denominated in dollars, and the dollar became more impor-
tant in global finance, as described in the second chapter.
21Though as Ford (1964) points out, the manipulation of the discount rate had conse-
quences for British exporters.
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Conclusions
We have argued that the 19th-century international financial system was
characterized by a distinction between center and periphery. For England,
the balance of payments did not restrict demand due to the role of ster-
ling in international finance. Other countries had to borrow in sterling
or as debtors (in the case of the U.S.) had difficulty in managing capi-
tal flows. Financial dependence and the balance of payments constraint
were thus two sides of the same coin for many countries. The growth rate
predicted by balance on foreign payments is remarkably close to actual
growth. Thus, the U.S. faced income adjustments to disequilibrium in the
balance of payments, though the constraint was relaxed by the second half
of the century. In addition, we have argued that the shift after the Civil
War was a matter of type and not just size. The ability of entities in the
U.S. to issue debt denominated in domestic currency and avoid some of
the problems of capital inflow was positively impacted by the development
of a fiscal military state in the middle of the century.
The ability of the balance of payments constraint to predict growth so
accurately suggests that trade and external finance should be given a
somewhat larger role in U.S. economic history than is normally the case.
This paper suggests that the U.S. found itself in situation of financial de-
pendency, with external constraints on growth, that was similar to that
of Latin America. However, we have suggested a possible difference be-
tween the former colonies explaining their divergent growth paths that
may have been overlooked. The transformation of the balance of payments
constraint in the U.S. was the result of an alliance between domestic elites
and a burgeoning fiscal-military state. By the 1890s, the U.S. had estab-
lished itself as the dominant manufacturer in the world, and the dollar was
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on the brink of becoming a key currency. As Baghestani and Mott (2009)
argue, by this period, U.S. and British prices had a long run relationship
that British prices adjusted to. In addition, Huffman and Lothian (1984)
argue that while British business cycles had causal effects on U.S. busi-
ness cycles in the antebellum period, after the Civil War, the relationship
reversed. Meanwhile, Latin America was in the midst of what Mitchener
and Weidenmier (2007) have called a “meltdown.” If the balance of pay-
ments is the relevant constraint for these Latin American countries, the
difference between their growth paths and that of the U.S. might not have
been geography, culture, or institutions, but the nature of the state.
Finally, the presence of a situation of financial (and not just trade) de-
pendence starting in the early 19th century suggests that the fundamental
problem of the balance of payments constraint and dependency is present
under a variety of monetary arrangements. Indeed, as Vernengo (2006)
points out, the present hegemony of the dollar has meant that the collapse
of Bretton Woods and industrialization among the periphery did little to
break the cycle of dependency.
CHAPTER 4
ASSYMETRIC ADJUSTMENT IN THE
JACKSONIAN ERA
Introduction
The crisis years 1837-1843 in the U.S. have long occupied the imag-
ination of economic historians. By some accounts, the crisis (or series
of crises depending on one’s perspective) counts among the worst in the
nation’s history. The period has of course also drawn the attention of po-
litical and social historians as it represented a widespread change in the
structures of American life.
Debates surrounding the period have focused on the economic policy
pursued by Jacksonians. Among economists, the debate over the merits
of Jackson’s famous economic endeavors has focused on whether the eco-
nomic troubles of the period originated within the nations borders or from
without. The simultaneous difficulties in Great Britain prompted some,
most notably Temin (1969), to see the crisis as tangential to Jackson’s
policies which may have made things worse but were not the root cause. A
tradition among early historians of the period, one that has become more
popular of late, holds that the destruction of the Second Bank of the United
States and the reorganization of the nation’s specie reserve produced the
crisis. Both interpretations, however, have tended to focus on the quantity
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of money as the primary cause of the price and output fluctuations of the
period. Additionally, some have even suggested that the period was pri-
marily characterized by a strong deflation rather than declines in the level
of activity.
A relatively ignored element of the crisis has been the assymetric method
by which the U.S. and Britain adjusted to shocks in the balance of pay-
ments. This paper argues that the 1837-1843 crisis is an early instance
of asymmetric adjustment mechanisms under a specie standard. The ex-
tent to which the severity of the crisis can be attributed to external or
internal causes can be difficult to parse out. However, certain structural
features of the British and U.S. economies imply that the adjustment to a
balance of payments may have been stabilizing in terms of output for the
one, but destabilizing for the other. That is, though intervening variables
make assigning blame difficult, we can suggest that all else equal external
adjustment implied changes in income in the U.S. but not necessarily in
Britain. The asymmetric pattern of adjustment can be seen throughout
the 19th century in British dealings with the peripheral countries of the
world. British stability, it will be argued, was the result of peripheral in-
stability. Thus, the changes in income in the U.S. in the 1830s and 1840s
were directly related to stabilizing forces in Britain.
The role of London as the center of international finance had been es-
tablished, in a preliminary form, after Waterloo. Additionally, it is during
this period that British industrial expansion began to take off. This was
intimately related to external markets both in terms of the share of ex-
ports in manufactures (Esteban, 1997) and import demands of primary
commodities (Harley, 2004). The dominance of the British in the trade
of many countries including the antebellum U.S. meant that short-term
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credit denominated in pounds was in high demand. The importance of
London in international capital markets then meant that it could, with
changes in the Bank of England’s discount, attract capital from around
the world almost at will. In addition to attracting capital, British financing
of the commodity trade implied that British discount policy was a major
factor in the determination of commodity prices. Thus, in the presence of
a balance of payments deficit, the British could raise rates, attract capital,
and adjust their terms of trade.
In the U.S., however, when capital returned to London, even very high
interest rates could not reverse the tide. In addition, export revenues
declined as commodity prices fell. With external debts accumulated in
pounds, debt service burdens grew and eventually led to default. In or-
der to meet the challenge of capital flight, the U.S. had to adjust spending
and income to bring imports in line with (reduced) exports. Capital flows,
prices, and the level of exports all became destabilizing.
For the British, commodity price movements and capital flows served
to lessen the adjustment burden. In what follows, it will be argued that
this feature of asymmetric adjustment has been relatively ignored in the
current literature. The Keynesian adjustment mechanisms that described
the classical gold standard are thus equally applicable at the beginning of
the century.1
After reviewing some key features of the antebellum economy, the ex-
isting literature is surveyed and then the balance of payments adjustment
mechanisms discussed. The paper concludes with a note on the surprising
similarity between the U.S. cycle and cycles among peripheral countries in
the 19th century.
1See (Bordo & Schwartz, 1984) for a summary of views of the classical gold standard.
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Background
The economic issues of the 1830s and 1840s in the United States have
been the focus of a great deal of controversy. It would be prudent then to
begin with a short survey of the buildup and subsequent damages left by
a period of economic distress considered among the worst in U.S. history,
which eventually resulted in the default of nine states.
1830 marked in many ways, a turning point for the United States both in
its economics and its politics. The U.S. experienced a period of prosperity
for much of the 1830s characterized by the rise of domestic manufactures,
an expansion of trade, particularly with Britain, and large waves of immi-
gration of both people and capital. In addition, the Jacksonian era of presi-
dential politics had been rung in with Andrew Jackson’s victory in the 1828
election on a platform of “reform.” What the Jacksonians meant by reform
was not always clear, but references were made to Jeffersonian first prin-
ciples and an attack on a perceived Federalist revival, motivated in part
by the “corrupt bargain” of the previous administration (Wilentz, 2006). In
economic matters, it meant a significant shift in the role played by fed-
eral and state government in the market. Not only did Jackson famously
remove federal deposits from the Second Bank of the United States and
revoke its charter, but he successfully extinguished the federal debt with
revenue from land sales (rather than tariffs which had been the primary
source of revenue up until that point), which were eventually demanded in
specie. The period also marked what (McCormick, 1973) dubbed the “sec-
ond party system,” composed of Whigs and Democrats whose differences
often revolved around the economic issues of the day.
The 1830s opened with rapid growth in GDP per capita which peaked
around 1836. The well-known panic in the spring of 1837 can be seen
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in the various macroeconomic indicators of Table 4.1, though all do not
agree on whether 1837 was characterized by actual declines in output. By
1839, most series suggest a recovery, only to collapse once again. Though
all of the series surveyed here suggest a decline in output in 1840, a major
question in the literature is the extent to which the crisis was characterized
by deflation or full depression, an issue to be dealt with below. A recovery
from both declines seems to only come by 1844-5.
Table 4.1: Various Aggregate Indicators: 1830-1845

































1830 1503 1751 1574 160 -76 23.801
1831 1595 1851 1597 163 -79 28.085
1832 1653 1918 1653 167 -88 31.533
1833 1711 1983 1725 176 -98 35.148
1834 1629 1884 1793 167 -113 33.579
1835 1691 1956 1716 182 -130 37.573
1836 1716 1983 1662 194 -134 40.249
1837 1662 1916 1754 185 -141 39.679
1838 1647 1898 1720 185 -181 40.697
1839 1727 1990 1825 201 -193 46.056
1840 1642 1893 1764 183 -162 43.881
1841 1608 1856 1772 200 -129 46.349
1842 1594 1839 1710 192 -131 47.656
1843 1619 1868 1668 193 -129 53.103
1844 1707 1970 1864 201 -138 59.452
1845 1734 2000 1882 209 -150 65.358
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ca9, Ca15-19.
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Thus the period has often been described as “double-headed” in terms of
a variety of macroeconomic data. Indeed, price data reflect a similar pat-
tern to GDP, if more severe in fluctuation. Figure 4.1 shows the monthly
evolution of prices between 1830 and 1845 using Smith and Cole’s (1935)
commodity price index. After something of a deflation in 1834 (associated
with high discount rates to be discussed below), the price index reflects
a significant inflationary boom. Peaking in February of 1837, prices re-
main low until late in 1838, reaching a second peak in early 1839. The
subsequent deflation was prolonged and severe. The trend did not reverse
until 1843. Whether or not the deflation after 1837 and the one after 1839
share the same causes has been a matter of much debate.
Source: Smith and Cole (1935)
Figure 4.1: Monthly Wholesale Commodity Prices: 1830-1845
(1834-42=100)
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An important factor in the fortunes of the antebellum U.S., was the At-
lantic trade. During the 1830s, as the economy grew rapidly, a substantial
trade deficit opened. Though export earnings grew rapidly, imports grew
more so. In addition, it should be noted that after each peak, both exports
and imports declined, but it is clear that changes imports brought the cur-
rent account into balance in after crisis. As J. G. Williamson (1964) notes,
throughout the 19th century, exports exhibit much milder fluctuations
than imports, and this seems particularly true of the 1830s and 1840s.
Services (primarily shipping), which were always positive, were only large
enough to cover the trade balance when a crisis had dramatically eased
the trade deficit. In addition, they were offset by growing debt service pay-
ments which peaked in 1839 and slowly subsided thereafter. As can be
seen from Table 4.2, it was a decline in imports that provided the primary
adjustment mechanism in the restoration of trade balance after 1837.
The obvious corollary of the deficit in current account was capital in-
flows, primarily from Britain. In J. G. Williamson (1964) classic study of
the U.S. balance of payments, he suggests that short-term capital move-
ments did not simply passively reflect trade needs, but were indeed a stim-
ulus to development. This is to some degree evidenced by the large fluctu-
ations of capital movement relative to imports. The relationship between
capital inflows and imports is clearly positive, though this is consistent
with the hypothesis that capital imports generate domestic growth which
in turn lead to increasing imports of consumption goods. While a large
portion of capital came in the form of loans (and later direct investments)
to the Second Bank of the United States, short-term commercial credit
played an extremely significant role. This mercantile credit came primarily

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Brothers, Rothschilds, and the three “Ws” - Wiggins & Co., Wilde & Co.,
and Wilson & Co. who had agents in the United States. By 1836, it was
estimated that roughly 20 million pounds had been extended on commer-
cial account (Davis & Cull, 1994). These merchant houses financed both
imports and exports. As Wilkins (2004, p. 60) notes, “the line between
importer, exporter and merchant banker often became invisible.” Foreign
capital was also directed to some extent to private banks, mainly in New
York. Notably, private investments were minor compared to the dominance
of government debts.
Though the federal government had steadily reduced outstanding debt
since the Revolution, state governments began to raise their borrowing.
Not only did state borrowing rise, but by 1838, it had reached $172 mil-
lion, which was a greater sum than the federal government had ever owed
in its short history. The distribution of this borrowing among states is pre-
sented in Table 4.3. Roughly $65 million of this was foreign owned, which
again was a much greater sum than the federal government had ever owed
abroad (Wilkins, 2004). This money was used by states to fund banks as
well as canal and railroad companies in return for stocks or bonds in these
entities. Bonds issued by the states were purchased by banks or mer-
chants, moving then to Europe to finance trade debts. Bonds were often
made payable in sterling, thus subjecting the states to a substantial ex-
change rate risk.2 In general, then, it could be said that state governments
were the primary conduit through which international capital flowed.
After the Civil War, foreign capital seemed to be far less concentrated in
portfolio holdings of public sector debt with the rise of direct investment
in railroad securities. However, we should also distinguish between the
2McGrane (1935) has a complete discussion of the methods by which the state debts
were issued and marketed.
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Table 4.3: State Borrowing: 1820-1841
(in thousands of $)
Amount Borrowed
State 1820-25 1825-30 1830-35 1835-38 Total Outstanding
Debt,
1841
Alabama 100 . . . 2,200 8,500 10,000 15,400
Arkansas . . . . . . . . . 3,000 3,000 2,676
Florida . . . . . . 1,500 . . . . . . 4,000
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,310
Illinois . . . . . . 600 11,000 11,600 13,527
Indiana . . . . . . 1,890 10,000 11,890 12,751
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . 7,369 7,369 3,085
Louisiana 1,800 . . . 7,335 14,000 23,135 23,985
Maine . . . . . . 555 . . . 555 1,735
Maryland 58 577 4,210 6,648 11,493 15,215
Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . 4,290 4,290 5,424
Michigan . . . . . . . . . 5,340 5,340 5,611
Mississippi . . . . . . 2,000 5,000 7,000 7,000
Missouri . . . . . . . . . 2,500 2,500 842
New York 6,873 1,624 2,205 12,229 22,931 21,797
Ohio . . . 4,400 1,701 . . . 6,101 10,924
Pennsylvania 1,680 6,300 16,130 3,167 27,277 36,336
South Carolina 1,250 310 . . . 4,000 5,560 3,691
Tennessee . . . . . . 500 6,648 7,148 3,398
Virginia 1,030 469 686 4,133 6,318 4,037
Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Total 12,791 13,680 41,513 107,824 174,307 192,945
Source: Ratchford (1966), p. 79.
intention of capital inflows in these two periods. During the 1830s and
early 1840s, British money was primarily directed toward the expansion
and transportation of cotton production. The 1840s and 1850s witnessed
money directed toward the expansion of Western grain production, coin-
ciding with a shortage of crops in Britain. After the Civil War, British
money seemed to be directed to railroad securities, but these very obvi-
ously had more to do with domestic commerce than the bringing of primary
commodities to the international market D. North (1961).
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Table 4.4 presents the uses to which state debt was directed. Though
the aggregates suggest that canal investment was the largest destination
for funds, these mask regional differences. In the South, the vast major-
ity of state debts were used to fund land banks or American bills, both
of which served to expand cotton production for European consumption
(J. G. Williamson, 1964). The vast majority of this capital tended to be on
relatively short terms.
Early in 1837, trade and domestic production was depressed, as men-
tioned earlier. At the same time, foreign capital also became scarce, while
the Bank of England increased its discount rate and refused to discount
securities relating to U.S. trade. The three “Ws” suspended payments, and
the Rothschild agents failed. Additionally, the Bank of the United States
Table 4.4: The Uses of Outstanding State Debt in 1838
(in thousands of $)
State Banking Canals Railroads Turnpikes Miscellaneous Total
Alabama 7,800 . . . 3,000 . . . . . . 10,800
Arkansas 3,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000
Florida 1,500 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500
Illinois 3,000 900 7,400 . . . 300 11,600
Indiana 1,390 6,750 2,600 . . . . . . 11,890
Kentucky 2,000 2,619 350 . . . . . . 7,369
Louisiana 22,950 50 500 . . . 235 23,735
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . 555 555
Maryland . . . 5,700 5,500 . . . 293 11,493
Massachusetts . . . . . . 4,290 . . . . . . 4,290
Michigan . . . 2,500 2,620 . . . 220 5,340
Mississippi 7,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,000
Missouri 2,500 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500
New York . . . 13,317 3,788 . . . 1,158 18,262
Ohio . . . 6,101 . . . . . . . . . 6,101
Pennsylvania . . . 16,580 4,964 2,596 3,167 27,307
South Carolina . . . 1,550 2,000 . . . 2,204 5,754
Tennessee 3,000 300 3,730 118 . . . 7,148
Virginia . . . 3,895 2,129 355 343 6,662
Total 54,140 60,202 42,871 6,619 8,475 172,306
Source: Ratchford (1966), p.88.
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(which had now become rechartered in Pennsylvania after Jackson’s veto)
suspended specie payments. However, by 1838, there was enough confi-
dence for states to issue new bonds. The Bank of the United States had
by this time resumed specie payments and was still well regarded in Lon-
don. American securities then began to flood London, and fears began to
rise among a minority that the investments had taken on a speculative
character. Trouble began as the Bank of the United States once again sus-
pended specie payments, and other banks followed. Confidence seemed
to be shaken in U.S. state securities by October of 1839 (Wallis, 2001).
The debts of the states went unsold. In November of 1840, a shipment
of New York state bonds arrived in London to be exchanged for railroad
iron or cash. The Ironmasters, however, refused to deal in U.S. bonds or
stocks. Though the bonds were eventually sold, they received payment
significantly below par (Wilkins, 2004). London discount rates rose once
more. Eventually, the Bank of the United states failed, and since many
states had depended on the bank for loans to meet interest payments,
eight states and one territory stopped interest payments.
Internally, the influence of the Second Bank of the United States on do-
mestic exchanges should not be underestimated. As Knodell (1998) has
emphasized, the national bank, while it still held its charter, provided
an interbranch clearing system that smoothed domestic mercantile trans-
actions. Under Nicholas Biddle’s auspices, the branches replaced local
promissory notes with domestic bills of exchange. Merchants could draw
bills of exchange on correspondents in other cities. These in turn could
be discounted at the local Bank of the United States branch, for which
the merchant would receive bank notes. The Bank of the United States,
then, could ship bills of exchange between branches, crediting or debiting
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the account of one branch at another. The economies of scale related to
the clearing of mercantile (and other) debts lowered the average level of
internal exchange rates (Knodell, 1998). As a result, Second Bank branch
drafts were often substituted for gold as the reserve asset of other banks.
Though bills of exchange remained the central method of interregional pay-
ments settlement, the demise of the Second Bank of the United States did
seem to be associated with a rise in level and fluctuation of domestic ex-
changes, as they became decentralized.
The Source of Monetary Disturbances
The debates over the causes of the crisis in both 1837 and 1839 have
focused primarily on whether the origins of the crises were domestic or
foreign. Prior to Temin (1969) seminal book, a general consensus had
emerged that Jacksonian policies were directly responsible. In part, this
was accompanied by a rethinking of Jacksonian politics more generally
by historians (Wilentz, 2006). Jacksonian banking policies were thus
seen as essentially disastrous, and more broadly, the picture of Jack-
sonians as defenders of workers and small farmers began to be revised
in favor of a more dismal picture of Jacksonians as power hungry and
entrepreneurial.3 Even those who thought well of Jackson’s presidency
blamed his banking policies which represented good intentions, “thwarted
by the speculative propensities of the American people” (Temin, 1969, p.
19). Thus, whether one placed the emphasis on policy or on the specula-
tive nature of banks, the causes were considered primarily domestic.
As Temin points out, the prior consensus among historians was quite
3Several Marxist historians were always suspicious of Jackson’s populist leanings.
Thus, H. Frankel (1946) describes Jackson’s coalition as “the rule of an exploiting
class concealed behind the appeal to the common man.”
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striking. From McGrane (1924) to Schlesinger (1971) to Hammond (1991),
all agreed on the disastrous consequences of Jackson’s policy. Focusing
on the bank war, they argued that the Bank of the United States had
provided a check against speculative activity. By collecting large quantities
of bank notes from state chartered banks, the Second Bank of the United
States was able to provide the threat of mass redemption.4 In addition,
during times of stress, the Second Bank could refrain from redeeming
notes so as to provide liquidity.5 Jackson’s well-known veto of the bank’s
charter then allowed state banks to expand their note issue. Even prior to
his veto, Jackson had removed federal deposits from the Second Bank and
placed them with the “pet” banks. Without federal deposits, the Second
Bank lost much of its regulatory ability. It was of course during this period
that the number of banks chartered in the states grew.
According to the traditional explanation (which Rockoff (1971) dubbed
the “soundness” school), the result of an expansion of notes without an
appropriate backing of gold was inflation. Without the regulation of the
Second Bank, and flush with government deposits (which banks treated
as reserves), banks expanded loans and note issue often to finance spec-
ulative land purchases from the government. Of course, such speculation
and expansion of the money supply could not go on forever. For these his-
torians, it was the August 1836 order by Jackson, known as the “Specie
Circular,” requiring federal land sales to be made in gold that pricked the
bubble. The intention of the Circular was to reduce note issue and specu-
lation. In combination with the movement of federal deposits to pet banks,
4It should be noted that prior to 1837, there were no consistent regulations on banks
reserves Hammond (1991).
5Whether or not the Second Bank actually acted in a countercyclical manner is a matter
of debate. It did have some incentive as a private bank to raise rates to protect itself
in times of distress.
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however, the result was to draw gold Westward and increase the public’s
demand. In particular, gold left New York and moved to rural areas where
land sales were large Hammond (1991). The money supply thus contracted
and prices fell as banks suspended note redemption.
Temin’s (1969) revisionist story drew attention away from the Bank War
as well as the specie circular and distribution of surplus funds, and placed
responsibility with external events. Using the basic monetary decomposi-
tion as pioneered by M. Friedman and Schwartz (1971), Temin challenged
the notion that banks expanded credit without reason, enabled either by
the transfer of government deposits or lack of regulation provided by the
Second Bank. Instead, Temin argued that the increase in the money sup-
ply was “justified.”
Temin finds that there was indeed growth in the specie stock that other
historians had not detected. This was because the estimates for exchange
rates at the time suggest that though the pound was perhaps undervalued,
it had not reached the specie export point. Temin argues that instead of
looking to Europe, the source of the specie inflow could be found in the
form of silver imports from Mexico. Perhaps even more importantly, as the
silver imports were not large during the mid-1830s, was the decrease in
silver exports.
Temin suggests that there was a significant decline in the export of sil-
ver to China. That is, whereas before the mid-1830s silver imported from
Mexico was exported, it now remained within national borders. Persistent
trade deficits with China led British traders to import opium to China, a
potential solution to their trade problems due to its addictive nature. By
the 1830s, China’s trade balance had been reversed. Most notably, how-
ever, was the abandonment of silver demand and the adoption of bills on
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London to finance the opium trade. No longer requiring silver, American
merchants could use bills on London to purchase opium and then buy
Chinese goods with the opium. This strongly reduced the movement of sil-
ver between the U.S., China and Britain, resulting in the accumulation of
Mexican silver deposits in the U.S. Temin’s observed reserve ratios (Table
4.5) demonstrate that even after the removal of the Second Bank’s check
on state banks and the movement of federal deposits, the reserve ratios of
banks remained “remarkably constant.” In addition, at the regional level,
western states who were supposed to be at the heart of the speculation did
not have the lowest reserve ratios. Thus, Temin has constructed a price-
specie-flow mechanism, but one that essentially operated by accident.
Table 4.5: Temin’s Money Supply Decomposition: 1830-1845
Money Specie Reserve Ratio
Money Held
as Specie
Year Millions of $ Millions of $ Percent Percent
1830 114 32 23 6
1831 155 30 15 5
1832 150 31 16 5
1833 168 41 18 8
1834 172 51 27 4
1835 246 65 18 10
1836 276 73 16 13
1837 232 88 20 23
1838 240 87 23 18
1839 215 83 20 23
1840 186 80 25 24
1841 174 80 23 30
1842 158 90 33 35
1843 194 100 35 26
1844 214 96 27 24
1845 241 97 23 23
Source: Temin (1969, pp. 71, 159).
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The trade deficit and importation of British capital that emerged were,
according to Temin, the result of price changes caused by the increase in
silver. Import demand was then the result of changes in relative prices that
caused a substitution of U.S. produced goods for British goods. Temin
does not believe this could have been the result of changes in national
income. The eventual removal of British capital, then, produced a com-
mercial crisis that was primarily the result of falling cotton prices upon
which a large portion of the credit structure was built. Temin goes on to
tell a similar story about the crisis of 1839, which was caused in part by
a bumper cotton crop and British credit tightening. Using Gallman’s es-
timates of GDP, he suggests that even more than the crisis of 1837, the
1839 crisis was primarily monetary and associated with a large deflation
rather than output movements.
Since Temin’s seminal book (and associated articles), the tides have once
again turned against Jackson. Rousseau (2002) has argued that the sup-
plemental interbank transfers that were designed to prepare for the official
distribution of the federal surplus and the Specie Circular should bear the
blame. The consequence of these two federal policies was to significantly
reallocate specie between the states. That is, though the official distribu-
tion of the surplus was small (prompting Temin to discount it), there was a
series of supplemental transfers prior to the distribution which were larger
and did involve transfers of money (which Rousseau argues was in the
form of specie though it is not known for sure) westward. In other words,
rather than an external balance of payments crisis, Rousseau argues that
there was a significant internal payments crisis between the states making
eastern banks particularly vulnerable to British specie calls. In addition,
the Specie Circular produced a diversion of specie from commercial uses,
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to be “locked up” in pet banks.
Knodell (2006) has also placed an increased blame on Jackson. She ar-
gues that the Friedman-Schwartz decomposition used by Temin does not
capture the changes in bank balance sheets in the antebellum period.6
That is, antebellum banks relied less on deposits and more on equity
as a source of funds. Knodell identifies three sources of the increase in
bank credit: changes in bank reserves, changes in reserve ratios, and an
increase in bank equity. While Temin focuses on the first two, Knodell
suggests the third was more relevant to the 1830s and 1840s. With this
decomposition, she finds that these three determinants explain 88% of
bank loan growth in 1830-36, of which 56% could be attributed to equity
growth. It is notable that a portion of this equity was in the form of loans
to bank shareholders who paid in on an installment basis. The shares of
other banks were occasionally used as collateral for these loans. Thus,
though banks maintained reserve ratios, they collectively increased their
leverage. As Knodell argues, “because equity accounted for about half their
liabilities [state banks] were as much mutual funds, funding asset acqui-
sition with equity shares, as they were banks, funding asset acquisition
with reserve-backed notes and deposits” (Knodell, 2006, p. 570). Addi-
tionally, Knodell (1998) has demonstrated that the demise of the Second
Bank generated a high degree of variability in inland banknote exchange
rates.
Wallis (2001) has also brought Temin’s external causes under question.
In the crisis of 1839, Wallis argues that state debts were central. The
6Tobin (1965) argued that the restrictive nature of the Friedman-Schwartz decomposi-
tion was not particularly appropriate for the modern period either. By limiting them-
selves to currency and commercial bank deposits and ignoring other kinds of claims
on financial institutions the causal role to which Friedman and Schwartz attribute to
their money stock deserves some skepticism.
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crisis was then focused in the Southern and Western states (unlike the
panic of 1837) as they were the ones engaged in the heaviest borrowing.
The land boom, then, was financed by credit expansion and encouraged
state borrowing. When the banks who financed the expansion were unable
to meet obligations to states (beginning with the Morris bank’s obligation
to Indiana), the states defaulted and halted construction projects. That is,
states were financing their interest payments with proceeds from loans,
and when this money dried up, they were unable to meet their obligations.
Wallis thus argues that the crisis was primarily domestic and not related
to international payments.
A common element in the explanations of the inflation and subsequent
crisis of the 1830s and 1840s has been that they all involve monetary
causes. As Rockoff (1971) notes, “nearly all of the participants in the
debate have used a quantity theory framework for analyzing the Jackso-
nian inflation (and subsequent deflation)... The debate has centered on
which particular components of the money stock have changed and for
what reasons” (p. 450). A potential problem with these explanations may
concern the appropriate definition of the money stock. The definition of
what should and should not be considered money has a very long history,
one which would be difficult to summarize here. Clearly, for Temin and
most other commentators on the antebellum economy, the money supply,
following the Friedman-Schwartz definition, consists of basic liabilities of
banks: banknotes and deposits. These rest upon a base of specie reserves,
and as Knodell (2006) points out for the antebellum period, bank equity.
It is interesting to note, however, that, as the U.S. crisis wound down in
the 1840s, a debate on precisely this question raged across the Atlantic.
Known as the Currency-Banking School debates, they arose after a lasting
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deflation (related in part to the U.S. crisis as described below). On one side,
the Currency School argued that the key to stability was the control of
banknotes such that paper money would passively substitute for metallic
currency. For them, the money supply could be simply defined as the
banknotes and coin of the realm, and was solely responsible for changes
in the price level.
The Banking School argued, much like the antibullionists before them,
that an excess of notes could not be inflationary. Instead of relying on
the real bills doctrine, they made use of Thomas Tooke’s principle of re-
flux which argued that excess notes would find themselves redeemed, and
thus would not affect prices. Thus, Tooke argued, “... prices of commodi-
ties do not depend upon the quantity indicated by the amount of bank
notes, nor upon the amount of the whole circulating medium; but that,
on the contrary, the amount of circulating medium is the consequence
of prices” (Tooke, 1959, p.123). In this view, money should include not
only banknotes and coin, but also bank deposits, bills of exchange, ex-
chequer bills and other forms of credit (Smith, 2001). Along these lines,
Tooke distinguished between two branches of circulation. The first was be-
tween dealers and consumers, and the second between dealers and deal-
ers. The latter were undertaken primarily in bank loans and other forms
of credit that could be settled with bills of exchange and checks, and in-
volved transactions associated with production and wholesale distribution
of commodities. For Tooke, the point was to demonstrate that much of
British transactions were undertaken by the use of checks and bills of ex-
change without the need for banknotes. Since bills of exchange and credit
extended by dealers to dealers varied with the level of activity, the “cir-
culating medium” could not be considered the cause of price movements
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(Smith, 2001).
A similar criticism could then be made of the existing literature of the
Jacksonian crisis. The role of bills of exchange and other mercantile credit
between dealers should not be underestimated. As described earlier, the
main form of interbank settlement while the Second Bank was still feder-
ally chartered was through Second Bank drafts and the exchange of bills.
Indeed, the use of bills of exchange, and credit innovation in general, had
been a fact of life since the experience of colonial hard money scarcity
(Sylla, 1982). In that case, the requirements of colonial governments pro-
duced monetary innovation to satisfy their need. Thus, not only were bills
of exchange endogenous to demand, the general form of credit was as well.
By the 19th century, documentary bills, sight drafts, and banker’s accep-
tances were all in use. As a result, throughout the colonial and antebellum
periods, the growth of specie and prices were often at odds. It is not simply
that new credit creation could meet the needs of a growing economy, but
an inflow of gold need not increase the supply of money. Without credit-
worthy borrowers, banks could simply hoard the gold without increasing
note circulation, thus reducing its velocity. Alternatively, excess specie
could always be used to accumulate British bills, which were always in
demand due to their use in international trade.
We should note as well that the specie constraints on the growth of the
money stock globally could be criticized as well. As long as bills on Lon-
don served as useful reserve due to the position of London in international
capital markets, British long-term outflows can be positive without any
movements of gold (Serrano, 2003). In other words, the British balance
sheet can expand indefinitely as long as its long-term assets are balanced
by short-term liabilities, which will be ensured as long as bills of exchange
95
are accumulated by other countries like the U.S. The implication of this
is that there will be a demand for bills of exchange independent of trade
flows. Thus, the exchange rate between the U.S. and Britain will not nec-
essarily be the passive result of trade, but of changes in interest rates,
particularly changes in the British discount rate to be described below.
We have considerable reason to believe that prices in the antebellum
U.S. were not the simple result of changes in the money supply due to
either excessive note issue or the accumulation of Mexican silver. The
stock of specie had risen before without consequent changes in prices,
and significant price inflation had occurred without increases in the stock
of specie. Additionally, the explanation of prices as a result of excess
money balances should be associated with low interest rates in periods of
inflation and high interest rates in periods of low inflation or deflation. The
antebellum period, however, as can be seen in the data presented above,
conforms to the well known “Gibson’s paradox” in which interest rates and
prices seem to move in step.
A final objection, to be detailed in the next section, concerns the move-
ment of output and employment during the period 1837-1844. In a sense,
this reflects a second debate, in addition to the one regarding internal
vs. external causes, over whether the deflations of the antebellum period
(particularly the long deflation between 1839-1843) were in fact associated
with downturns in aggregate economic activity.
A long tradition among certain labor historians has maintained that the
crisis following 1837 and including the early 1840s represented a period
of significant unemployment and declines in output that provided an im-
petus to union organizing and labor consciousness.7 An alternative view,
7Commons (1966) is perhaps the first detailed treatment of long run labor history in the
U.S.. More modern proponents of this view include Wilentz (1984) and Laurie (1980).
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held by most of the contributors summarized above, suggests that unem-
ployment and declines in output tended to be small and at best temporary.
In their view, the price mechanism, unfettered by modern labor contracts
and monopoly pricing operated to eliminate labor surpluses rather effi-
ciently. The argument, as summarized by Goldin and Margo (1992) thus
hinges on whether real wages were flexible or sticky. If real wages showed
a sustained increase during periods of deflation, unemployment should
be expected, while if real wages fell we should expect the labor market to
clear. Their econometric work on Margo and Villaflor’s (1987) wage data
suggests that real wage shocks were transitory (the time series, in other
words, do not exhibit unit roots) and thus long run unemployment should
not be expected. In the short-run, however, there was some degree of
nominal wage lag that might account for temporary unemployment. Thus,
price decreases, caused primarily by monetary phenomenon in the view
of Temin and the authors summarized above, could be associated with
temporary unemployment. 8
In the antebellum period, we may note that the rising debt service costs
8The analysis of the relationship between output and price flexibility hinges on the labor
market. There is, of course, a tradition in economic theory emphasizing a variety of
stabilizing consequences of wage and price flexibility on output. Wicksell (1962), for
instance, argued that deflation may put pressure on the monetary rate of interest,
potentially causing it to fall to the natural rate. Pigou (1943) famously argued that a
“real balance effect” may imply that deflation increases the real value of wealth and
thus consumption. Modigliani (1944) suggested that deflation would be associated
with declining money demand and thus a falling rate of interest and a subsequent rise
in investment. Thus, even if nominal wages were inflexible, other stabilizing features
of deflation will counter this effect.
An alternative tradition, associated with Keynes (1997) and the modern post-
Keynesians, suggests that wage and price flexibility may actually make output move-
ments more severe. This tradition has focused on the redistributive effects on aggre-
gate demand that may result from movements in wages, prices, and the interest rate.
We may add to this list the distributive effects of exchange rate movements associated
with changes in these variables, in particular the exchange rate, as emphasized by
structuralist authors (Taylor, 1983). Deflation may thus lead to changes in distribu-
tion between debtors and creditors as well as between workers and firms that affect
aggregate demand and thus output in indeterminate ways.
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did indeed increase in the deflation, and as a result, state governments
curtailed their expenditures severely and eventually defaulted. House-
holds and firms additionally found themselves unable to service their debts.
Indeed, the Texas Homestead Act of 1839, which prohibited the seizure of
homes by creditors, is a testament to the rising burden of debtors. Sim-
ilarly, the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (short lived as it was) was in-
tended to relieve debtors of some of their burden. Given the state of affairs,
Philip Hone merchant (and mayor) of New York wondered in 1839, “how
the poor man manages to get a dinner for his family.”9 Hone went on to
complain that in 1840, his three grown sons could not find work.
Though the consequences of deflation on debt service will be dealt with in
the next section, we may additionally note that price flexibility was not only
supposed to clear labor and domestic output markets, but to resolve the
imbalance on current account. Temin (1969) and others have suggested
that domestic prices were the primary adjustment mechanism leading to
changes in exchange rates and net exports without significant changes
in income, particularly in 1839.10 The rising prices of 1836 did not pro-
duce a strong adjustment in the balance of payments because the inflow of
British capital temporarily held these forces off. However, given the elas-
ticity estimates presented in Chapter 3, imports were likely highly elastic
with respect to income, but less so with respect to prices. This is to some
extent confirmed by the coincidence of long run cycles of income and im-
ports before the Civil War as outlined by J. G. Williamson (1964) and the
long cycles identified in Chapter 3. The high income elasticity was due to
the nature of imports, which consisted primarily of textiles, manufactured
9As quoted in Rezneck (1935).
10Temin’s (1976) view that the money supply, perfectly vertical with respect to the interest
rate, is the result of movements in gold is somewhat surprising given his later view of
the Great Depression.
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foodstuffs, and to some degree iron for railway building. Goods, in other
words, that could not easily be substituted for in the event of domestic
price changes. Imports did the bulk of the work in correcting external bal-
ance at the time, and it is unlikely for these kind of sharp adjustments to
be caused by price movements.
The Adjustment to Balance of Payments
Disequilibrium
A longer run view suggests that the crisis of the late 1830s and early
1840s is not particularly unique in the history of specie standards. In
fact, periods of disinflation globally, accompanied by financial crises in pe-
ripheral economies, were common throughout the 19th century. The close
of the Napoleonic Wars changed the role played by the City of London in
the world economy drastically. The financing requirements of the British,
whose ability to raise debt likely played a decisive factor in the wars, led to
London’s displacement of Amsterdam as the center of international trade
and finance. A great deal of the financing of international trade began
to be conducted in bills of exchange denominated in pounds, and long-
term loans (many to sovereign governments) also became denominated in
pounds (Ferguson, 2001). In addition, the wars severely strained the close
link between the Spanish and Portuguese and their colonies in the New
World. As London grew in importance, it took advantage of the lack of
Spanish and Portuguese presence to begin to extend its loans and finan-
cial resources to finance the early years of independence for many Latin
American economies. Much of the capital went to finance the production
of raw materials. The lending boom ended with deflation, depression, and
eventual default (Dawson, 1990). It was a pattern to be repeated for many
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years afterward. Any financial boom is accompanied by varying degrees
of fraud, speculation, and increasing instability, whose details depend on
particular circumstances. In the Jacksonian period, it seems clear that
domestic financial fragility was encouraged by federal policy. However, a
longer view of these crises reveals certain structural features at work. In
particular, the asymmetric adjustment mechanism of center and periph-
ery during the 19th century remained relatively constant, even though the
details of financial instruments changed. While the British could adjust
through capital flows managed by monetary policy, much of the world, in-
cluding the antebellum U.S., had to adjust to imbalances on international
payments through changes in the level of activity.
As emphasized by Bloomfield (1963), Nurkse (1944) and others, capital
flows even during the classical gold standard could be considered desta-
bilizing in much of the world. For Great Britain, however, the adjustment
to external imbalances came, at least in the short-run, primarily through
adjustments to the rate of interest by the Bank of England. For much of
the 19th century, Britain ran trade deficits with the rest of the world while
it was simultaneously a net lender of long-term capital. This situation
was possible, without gold movements, because of the ability of London to
attract short-term capital inflows, and because of income from its interna-
tional investments. Thus, it did not normally run current account deficits,
while providing effective demand to the rest of the world.11 A curtailment
of British lending, however, would have to be met in the receiving countries
by (sometimes large) changes in the level of output. For the British, how-
ever, the reduction in long-term lending and the increase in short-term
11As it began to be subject to greater competition in manufactured goods from the U.S.
and Germany, England increasingly relied on trade within the empire to prevent a
deterioration of the current account. See De Cecco (1974).
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capital inflows associated with a rise in the Bank of England’s discount
rate did much of the work of equilibrating foreign payments.
During the period under consideration, the British balance of payments
did indeed show a consistent trade deficit as seen in Table 4.6. As men-
tioned above, however, other items kept the current account essentially in
surplus. The gap in trade in services was most often more than covered by
net interest and dividend income. As Ford (1958) points out, the interest
and dividend income was the result of long-term overseas lending. Thus,
British foreign lending created the current account surpluses required to
cover it. Additionally, short-term capital inflows meant that the British
acted as something of a banker to the world, borrowing short and lending
long.
The ability to attract short-term credit was a direct result of Britain’s
place in world trade and finance. The British were primary buyers of
the main U.S. export, cotton. Bills on London thus emerged through the
Southern cotton trade and were accumulated by banks. In particular,
while it maintained its federal charter, the Second Bank was the primary
dealer in foreign bills of exchange (Knodell, 2006). We may note as well
that specie movements were quite small throughout the 19th century, with
short-term bills of exchange clearly substituting. Bills on London were
particularly attractive since the majority of imports were of British origin,
and as mentioned earlier, trade with other nations (like China) could be
conducted in bills on London.
The British, throughout the century, were thus increasingly able to es-
tablish the pound as a global currency. This meant that they could most
always settle their external obligations in sterling. As a result, British debt











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































century with a debt-to-GDP of over 100%, sometimes reaching over 200%
(Ferguson, 2008). British short-term interest rates, determined by the
Bank of England, became the base interest rate for the global economy,
and it received special privileges of external adjustment.
For the U.S., however, certain issues of external debt had to be denom-
inated in pounds while almost all had to at least have a gold clause. It
should be noted that though the federal government had been almost im-
mediately able to issue debt in dollars on the London market after the Rev-
olution, the individual states were not so fortunate. Often underwritten by
large merchant houses, the Barings in particular, state issues of debt in
London throughout the first half of the 19th century were for the most part
denominated in pounds (Ratchford, 1941). Thus, they were subject to a
potential exchange rate risk.
After 1830, British foreign lending to the U.S. came primarily in the form
of long-term capital to states with the intention of supporting the produc-
tion of raw materials (Wilkins, 2004). Thus, an additional equilibrating
mechanism for the British was the increase in exports that resulted as
British capital went abroad to finance a variety of infrastructure projects
which required British produced industrial goods. In this sense, the in-
crease in foreign lending can actually create an increase in the demand for
foreign lending. We may add that this is not only because the loans were
often used to purchase foreign capital goods, but they were required to ser-
vice existing debt, and to the extent they financed domestic expenditures,
they led to increasing import demand. For the U.S., then, it seems to be
the case that the arrival of British capital caused an increase in domestic
demand that could only be satisfied with increasing imports.
The capital export was additionally associated with good harvests and
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rapid growth in the textile industry in Britain, which created an increasing
demand for cotton and other primary commodities, driving their prices
up.12 The relative ease with which bills associated with U.S. trade were
discounted in Britain seemed likely to contribute as well (Matthews, 1954).
The price of these commodities, which formed the core export revenue
for the U.S., depended in large extent to the pace of industrialization in
England, and its monetary policy. In times of rapid industrialization in
England, commodity prices would be high, and during times of slower
growth, commodity prices would be low.
Though external debt rapidly accumulated during this period, borrowing
agents, and in particular the states, were able to meet their debt service
obligations. With high export prices, debt service was manageable despite
rising domestic discount rates and an increasingly depreciated currency.
The rise in U.S. export (primarily cotton) prices, however, leads to in-
creasing costs for British producers. As emphasized in the above discus-
sion, commodity prices are the result both of demand conditions resulting
from the pace of industrial output growth, financing conditions, and any
climate or other natural limits on production. Industrial prices, however,
were primarily determined by the cost of production, of which primary
commodities are one of several components.13 It should be noted, then,
that to the extent British monetary policy affected the price of commodi-
ties, it would influence the costs of production of industrial goods and,
12The pattern of price inflation domestically seemed to associated most closely with the
allocation of bank financed loans.
13Tooke (1844) suggested around this time that prices were primarily determined by the
cost of production. The cost of production theory of prices of course has a long history
in economics. Kalecki (1971) in particular emphasizes the distinction between the
determination of primary commodity prices and industrial prices. The conditions of
supply in industry are such that output can generally be expanded with constant or
declining average costs.
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depending on the response of the markup, their prices.14 In general dur-
ing this period, British prices were less volatile than the prices of imported
primary goods. Imlah’s (1950) terms of trade series, for instance, implies
an import price variance 50% higher than export prices between 1830 and
1845. Of course, cotton prices specifically prove even more volatile.
Thus, as U.S. export prices rise, British terms of trade deteriorate and
increasing pressure is placed on the merchandise balance. Between 1835
and 1836, the current account surplus was more than halved (Table 4.6).
Though this was not associated with a specie drain, 1837 witnessed pres-
sure on the net specie balance. When its current account was strained,
or when its long-term lending was not balanced by short-term flows, the
Bank of England could, with adjustments to its discount rate, attract
short-term flows from around the world. Additionally, sharp changes in
the discount rate would affect the financing conditions for stocks, as em-
phasized by Matthews (1954). As it increased its interest rates to bring
in short-term capital, price of imports would collapse. Once import prices
had sufficiently fallen, and short-term flows became satisfactory, inter-
est rates (quite high in real terms in the context of the disinflation) would
slowly fall.
This was indeed the policy of the Bank of England even prior to the
1844 Bank Act when monetary policy was supposed to be governed by
the “Palmer rule” (Clapham, 1945). The rule required that during peri-
ods of “full currency,” when Bank reserves were at a maximum and the
exchanges implied a zero balance on specie movements, Bank securities
should be held equal to two-thirds of the liabilities. If conditions changed
such that bullion would be imported or exported, the securities of the
14Pivetti (1991) following Sraffa (1960) suggests that the rate of interest may also govern
the rate of profit.
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Bank were to be held constant at the level just defined (Matthews, 1954).
Whether or not the Bank followed the rule closely or not is a matter of
debate that is beyond the scope of this paper.15 More important for our
purpose is the general relationship between the Bank of England’s dis-
count rate and the state of the foreign exchanges. Discount rates rose
when gold or claims on it began to leave, and the rate lowered in the op-
posite case.16 Thus, Sayers argues that, “for almost a century before 1914
the Bank regarded itself as primarily responsible for the protection of the
gold reserve.. the Bank had settled to the view that it was by the manip-
ulation of an effective Bank Rate that the Bank could protect its reserve
consistently...” (Sayers, 1976, p. 28). This concern with the foreign ex-
changes meant that countries who were the recipients of long-term British
capital flows after Waterloo had access to foreign capital only as long as
the Bank accommodated.
We can see the restoration of British terms of trade and its mechanism in
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. The impact of the Bank of England’s discount
rate on U.S. export prices is clear. As U.S. export prices mounted, the
bank rate was increased to 4.5% and then to 5% in 1836 from 4% where
it had been since 1827. Additionally, certain bills associated with U.S.
trade were refused by the Bank (Clapham, 1945). The financing costs of
commodities for British importers increased, and goods were released from
bond in great quantities as stocks had been built up in 1836 (Matthews,
1954). The slowing of British industry also resulted in a decline in demand
for raw cotton. It was not simply cotton prices that collapsed, but a variety
of assets financed through the banking system. The domestic financial
15Viner (1965) argued that the Bank frequently violated the rule.
16Interestingly, there seems to be a great deal of evidence that the supply of British
domestic credit was much more elastic with respect to level of activity rather than the
rate of interest (Matthews, 1954).
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Source: North (1966) and Homer and Sylla (2005). The Bank rate reflects yearly averages.
Figure 4.2: U.S. Export Price Index and the British Bank Rate
(1830=100)
Source: Imlah (1950)
Figure 4.3: British Import and Export Price Indices: 1830-1844
(1880=100)
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fragility emphasized by Rousseau (2002), Wallis (2001), and Knodell (2006),
thus played a significant role as well, particularly in the real estate market
which had been subject to speculation. Finally, the dollar became depreci-
ated against the pound further reducing the value of U.S. export earnings.
As export revenues fell, and capital moved back to London, discount
rates rose sharply in Boston and New York. Table 4.7 suggests that in-
terest rate spreads were increasing, but this seems to have only mildly
stemmed the outflow of capital. As mentioned earlier, this is the result of
the asymmetric positions of the two countries in international trade and
finance. The trouble, of course, is that interest rates began to rise and the
exchange rate began to depreciate at precisely the time when export prices
had collapsed. The effect, then, of depreciated exchange, low export prices,
and high domestic and international interest rates is to severely increase
the burden of debt service. The solvency of countries in this situation, as
pointed out by Domar (1950), is determined by the rate of exports and the
rate of interest.
From Figure 4.2 and Table 4.7, it can be seen that capital returned by
1839, the exchanges settled, and export prices improved. Additionally, the
bank rate had been lowered in February of 1828 (Clapham, 1945). It is
during this period that a great deal of the borrowing by U.S. states took
place (Ratchford, 1941). Indeed, this in part accounts for the quick re-
covery as state spending proved to be countercyclical. As activity picked
up, British exports improved further encouraging capital outflows and in-
creasing commodity prices.
The final blow came as British specie holdings once again came under
pressure as inflation in U.S. export prices resumed. In addition, British















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































raised 6% until and held for several months until it was lowered to 5%
where it roughly remained until 1843. A bank rate held indefinitely high
was enough to provoke a prolonged deflation in global commodity prices,
finally restoring the British terms of trade and profit rates by the mid-
1840s.
Adjustment was not costless for the British. As Matthews (1954) notes,
the years 1841-1842 were associated with significant declines in output,
but this does not seem to be associated with the balance of payments.
Indeed, by this time, much of the imbalance had been corrected. Thus,
Matthews concludes that the principle cause was a fall in domestic invest-
ment and a poor harvest. A fall in exports to the U.S. certainly played a
role, but was perhaps offset by increases in exports to Europe. Regardless,
a degree of output adjustment is to be expected, even when the British
dominance of international finance was at its height.
For the U.S., however, the rising burden of debt service and the decline
in export receipts necessitated a large change in the level of activity in
order to adjust to a lack of foreign lending. In the deflation of the early
1840s, nine states found themselves unwilling or unable to make interest
payments on their debt. Most accounts of the defaults have emphasized
the corrupt and speculative nature of the state expenditures. Though cer-
tainly some degree of inefficiency in investment was present, two points
must be remembered. First, the financing of development projects in par-
ticular had dried up prior to their completion. Thus, the return on these
investments was not realized. As Ford (1983) discusses in the Argentinian
context in 1890, the slow maturing of infrastructure projects associated
with the commodity trade suggests that it is perhaps best to think of the
crisis as one of “development” rather than one primarily of fiscal excess.
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Additionally, the dynamics of debt imply that its growth rate relative to in-
come depends on the interest rate minus the growth rate of output (Domar,
1944). When the debt is external, one must take into account the avail-
ability of foreign exchange earnings and the exchange rate to the extent
that the debt is denominated in a foreign currency. Since, as mentioned
earlier, the debts of states and much of the mercantile establishment were
denominated in pounds (or had gold clauses), the low price of cotton and
the depreciated dollar suggest unstable debt dynamics. Thus, for the U.S.,
rising interest rates, falling prices, and depreciation could not resolve the
balance of payments problem, and in fact, made it worse whereas for the
British, these factors proved stabilizing.
Conclusion
A common feature of the current economic literature on the Jacksonian
period is, as Rockoff (1971) pointed out, its commitment to monetarist
explanations of the crises. Monetary forces caused rapid prices changes
and produced financial distress. In addition, prices provided the main
adjustment mechanism to shifts in the balance of payments. This arti-
cle suggests that given the structure of the U.S. economy at the time, as
well as its relations with England, it would be innapropriate to assign the
stock of money a causal role. As Phelps Brown and Ozga (1955, pp.177-
178) noted in regards to long run price movements since 1790, “the evi-
dence obliges us to conclude that in the secondary secular movements of
prices the quantity of money played a passive part, adapting itself to the
requirements of changes in turnover which were independently initiated.”
In addition, price declines could not produce balance of payments adjust-
ment and were in fact destabilizing given the external debt commitments
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and commodity trade denominated in pounds. Future work should exa-
nine the structural pattern of domestic inflation to identify the changes in
domestic distribution that resulted from shifts in British monetary policy.
Thus, while Jacksonian policy surely caused increasing financial fragility
internally, as pointed out by Wallis (2001), Rousseau (2002), and Knodell
(2006), the shift in capital flows necessitated a change in the level of activ-
ity all else equal.
The 1837-1843 crisis was not particularly unique over the 19th century
in this respect. As a result of the asymmetric adjustment mechanisms, we
observe recurrent long phases in the 19th century which are characterized
by disinflation in central countries, and waves of macroeconomic crises in
the periphery. Indeed, Suter (1992) has identified waves of sovereign de-
faults in the global economy since 1820. The defaults of nine U.S. states
comes precisely at the peak of the first wave of sovereign defaults. Sur-
rounding the U.S. defaults were Spanish, Portugese, Greater Colombian,
Mexican, Brazilian, Greek, and Peruvian defaults.
As Ginzburg and Simonazzi (2011) emphasize, these phases seem to be
associated with three things. First, there are significant swings in the
monetary policy of the center. A somewhat lax policy is reversed by strong
contractionary increases in interest rates. Second, commodity prices, or
primary products experience a high degree of volatility, which seems to be
connected to industrialization in the center. Finally, these phases of dis-
inflation are accompanied by rapid technological technological progress,
particularly in transportation, which tends to enable the periphery to gain
increasing access to central markets. The U.S. cycle described above fits
these broad outlines fairly well.
We may note, then, that as long as the British were able to hold their
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place in international trade and finance, they were successfully able to
avoid a balance of payments constraint on output growth, even under a
gold standard system. While the U.S. was not during the first half of the
century, as noted in Chapter 3 of this work, the constraint was increas-
ingly irrelevant. As the constraint became lifted, domestic demand was
increasingly relevant as the primary constraint on growth. We can say,
then, following Vernengo (2006), that the U.S., along with much of the pe-
riphery was characterized by financial dependency. What is particularly
interesting about the U.S. case was that it eventually escaped such cy-
cles while many of the countries of Latin America (some of whom gained
their independence at roughly the same time) not only experienced these
cycles throughout the 19th century, but witnessed their return after the
1980s. The U.S. development over the course of the century then offers an
instructive lesson for current development economics.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In the chapters above, I have argued three related themes. First, the
so-called “developmental” state played a significant role in long run U.S.
growth. That is, the orientation of the state toward domestic development
should be included among the fundamental causes of growth. The role for
the state makes sense when growth is demand led, and in particular when
countries are balance of payments constrained in the long run, as argued
in Chapter 3. For the U.S., this constraint was relaxed over the 19th cen-
tury as a result of state efforts. The 1837-1843 crisis can thus be seen
as an example of short-run adjustment to a long run balance of payments
constrained growth rate. This crisis also suggests that a central feature of
the balance of payments constraint is international power and, in partic-
ular, international monetary power. Asymmetric adjustment mechansims
thus should be a key feature of growth theory, and were certainly central
to the antebellum business cycle.
The hope of this dissertation is that the preceding pages have provided
an initial foray into an explicitly classical-Keynesian version of economic
history. I have argued that this tradition and its reversal of the causali-
ties of mainstream economics has a great deal to offer the study of eco-
nomic history. Though this potential has existed for some time, work
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amongst those in the “heterodox” schools has not exploited them. An
exception should be noted for a handful of Marxist economists, though
they have, in many cases, found themselves on the same side (at least
superficially) as mainstream authors in terms of the causal mechanisms
referenced above.1 The potential for historical insight exists not simply
because the classical-Keynesian tradition reverses causation in its “core”
equations, but because it is in essence an “open” system. The explanation
of distributive shares, the accumulation process, and their relationship as
envisioned by the classical-Keynesian system cannot be considered closed
without the contribution of history.
The areas in which heterodox authors can make historical contributions
are seemingly endless. In the context of U.S. history, monetary issues have
been a dominant political concern since the colonial era, but the endoge-
nous money theorists have been silent on them until the early 20th cen-
tury. The income flows between the plantation south, midwest, northeast,
and mid-Atlantic very nearly cry out for a structuralist treatment. Simi-
larly, long run price cycles have not been analyzed from the perspective of
cost-push or distributive conflict inflation. Estimates of growth rates may
perhaps be revised in light of plausible spending elasticities.
Perhaps most importantly, the histories of currently developed countries
offer a great deal of insight for development economists, a notion recently
revived by Chang (2002) and Bairoch (1998) among others, though it has a
long ways to go. While dependency authors looked to the colonial roots of
technological dependency, they did so without a thorough comparison to
1See Acemoglu et al. (2001) for a passing reference to some of the similarities in class
analysis. Dutt (2011) argues that many macroeconomic models inspired by Marxian
schemes of reproduction adhere to Say’s Law in the long run. Though it is true that
many Marxists have taken effective demand seriously, there is scant evidence of this
in their historical work.
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the colonial roots of technological independence and dominance. Finally,
the historical roots of financial dominance and so-called “original sin” have
been almost completely ignored. These issues are only the beginning of
what is clearly a very long list. One hopes that as heterodox economics
further matures, it attempts to strengthen its connection to the historical
record.
APPENDIX
In light of the dependency cycle described above, we can then construct
a parsimonious and stylized model of the crisis as follows. The growth rate
of the debt of states (federal debt is assumed extinguished) follows well-
known rules of debt dynamics. That is, as established by Domar (1944),
the growth rate of debt to GDP will depend not only on new borrowing, but
on the relationship between the real interest rate and the growth rate of
domestic income. In addition, da Silva and Vernengo (2007) point out that
for countries who must borrow in foreign currency, the exchange rate is
also relevant. Thus,we can write a version of “least controversial equation





+ (iuse− gus − P˙c
Pc
)d (5.1)
where d is debt to income, G−T is state level deficits, Y is current income,
i is the interest rate, g is the rate of growth of income, Pc is the price of
commodities (in this case, primarily cotton), and e is the exchange rate
(pounds per dollar). Dots represent the time derivative of a variable. That
is, the change in debt to income is the result of changes in the primary
deficit, but also the interest rate, growth rate of income, inflation, and
the exchange rate. In this case, I have assumed that all debt is external
(and thus subject to fluctuations in the exchange rate). This implies that
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the relevant inflation rate is the inflation of exportable commodities prices;
thus, the rate of interest is deflated by cotton prices.
In addition, we can describe the growth of income as the result of au-
tonomous demand. In this case, we can separate the growth of exports,
and domestic autonomous demand. The growth of exports can be de-
scribed as:
X˙us = xgB (5.2)
where X is exports, and x is the propensity of the British to spend on
exports out of income. In addition, the subscripts US and B refer to the
United States and Great Britain, respectively. The growth of domestic
income can be described as:
gus = α(xgB + z) (5.3)
where α is the multiplier, and z is the growth of domestic autonomous
demand. In our case, state government expenditures play a large role in
these expenditures, as does autonomous consumption and investment.
Thus, the growth rate of domestic income is determined in a traditional
Keynesian fashion according to the principle of effective demand.
The rate of inflation in commodities is governed by two factors. First,
in our time frame, the supply of commodities is likely inelastic; thus, the
growth of export demand for commodities will play an important role in
price determination. Second, the world commodity trade is financed by
British entrepreneurs who will hoard or dip into their commodity stocks in
response to cost of financing inventories. Thus, at high interest rates, mer-
chants will release more commodities into the market, and at low interest
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rates, merchants will tend to hoard commodities. We can thus write:
P˙c
Pc
= φ(xgb)− γiB (5.4)
In this case, α reflects the elasticity of prices with respect to demand (or
the inverse of the price elasticity of demand) and γ reflects the sensitivity
of commodity prices to the interest rate.
The nominal exchange rate (here expressed as pounds per dollar) is de-
termined by the relative interest rates in the U.S. and Britain and relative
position of the exchange rate to its long run norm. Finally, the accumula-
tion of external debt may cause a decline in the demand for dollars. Thus,
our equation for the evolution of the exchange rate is:
e˙ = σ(iB − iUS) + θ(e¯− e) + µd (5.5)
where σ is the interest sensitivity of British demand for dollars, e¯ is the long
run exchange rate associated with stability under the gold standard, θ is
the sensitivity of the demand for dollars to deviations from the long run
exchange rate, and finally, µ is the sensitivity of the demand for dollars
to the accumulation of foreign debt. Notably absent from our exchange
rate equation is the effect of relative prices, which we are assuming are
swamped by the other effects. The equation reflects an asset demand view
of exchange rate determination, where the right-hand side variables are
assumed to affect the demand for dollar denominated assets, rather than
underlying fundamentals as in a purchasing power parity or neoclassical
monetary models.2
Plugging equation (3) into (4), we get:
2See Harvey (2001) and Vernengo (2001) for attempts at Keynesian determinations of





+ (iUSe− xgB(α + φ)− αz + γiB)d (5.6)
which, with equation (5) gives us a system of two dynamic equations. Note
that this implies a somewhat different condition for the stability of public
debt than is usually assumed. Normally, all that is required for public debt
sustainability is that the domestic rate of interest be less than domestic
growth. In our case, stability requirements are a bit more stringent. The
local stability of the system will depend on the Jacobian below:
 −θ µ
iUSd (iUSe− xgB(α + φ)− αz + γiB)
 (5.7)
Stability requires a positive determinant of the Jacobian. Thus, we get
the stability condition:
(gB + z) >
θ(iUSe− φgB + γiB) + iUSdµ
θα
(5.8)
In addition, stability requires the trace to be negative:
−θ + (iUSe− xgb(α + φ)− αz + γiB) < 0 (5.9)
If the system becomes unstable, debt to GDP growth can become explo-
sive, regardless of current deficits. All else equal stability is more likely
when British and domestic autonomous demand growth, and the multi-
plier are large. Stability is also more likely in the case of low British and
U.S. interest rates and low sensitivity of capital flows to debt accumula-
tion. Finally, higher sensitivity of commodity prices to British demand and
lower sensitivity to interest rates encourages stability.
In this case, faster British growth makes debt more likely to be sustain-
120
able to the extent that it increases domestic income, and causes commod-
ity prices to rise. High British or U.S. interest rates (which, as we noted
earlier will tend to move together) will make debt less likely to be sustain-
able, both because of effects on nominal debt accumulation and because
of the depressing effect of British interest rates on commodity prices. In
addition, a higher initial level of debt to GDP and a higher sensitivity of
the exchange rate to the stock of debt will make debt less likely to be
sustainable. Finally, a larger multiplier will make debt more likely to be
sustainable as will a greater sensitivity of the exchange rate to divergences
from the long run rate implied by the gold standard.
In the case of a primary deficit, the system may then be characterized by
a stable focus (Figure A.1 ) or a saddle path (Figure A.2). In the case of the
stable focus, debt to GDP is reduced as the growth of GDP (deriving from
British and domestic demand) is greater than the interest rate paid on the
debt. Indeed, the size of the deficit that will be consistent with a reduction
of debt to GDP will actually be larger, the greater the initial stock of debt
is. As debt to GDP is reduced, however, the exchange rate appreciation is
checked by concerns that it has moved far away from its long run norm.
The depreciation that results serves to increase the debt burden, but the
time path suggests a movement toward a stable focus level of debt to GDP.
In the case of the saddle path, debt to GDP explodes or shrinks depending
on the initial level of debt to GDP and the exchange rate.
The model then illustrates the basic outlines of our story. In the expan-
sionary phase of the cycle, high British growth, and low British interest
rates (as a result of the Bank of England’s policy), create high growth in
the U.S., an appreciation of the U.S. exchange rate, and commodity price
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Figure A.1: Stable Focus
Figure A.2: Saddle Point
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inflation. All of these combine to reduce the burden of external debt. We
thus find ourselves in the stable focus of Figure A.1.
In the downward phase, however, as British rates rise, U.S. rates follow,
and growth rates slow, the curves shift, and the system can be transformed
into the saddle path of Figure A.2. That is, as the British interest rate
increase (and growth slowdown) tends to come when U.S. economy is in
the northeast quadrant, the debt to GDP ratio will explode upward and
exchange rates will continually depreciate. Finally, the situation will be
worse to the extent that other components of domestic demand (like state
government expenditures) are curtailed as a result of a rising debt burden.
A paradoxical result, but one common to debt dynamics models (L. L. Pasinetti,
1997), is that the larger the debt burden the greater the fiscal space when
the system is stable. However, once the system becomes unstable, the
fiscal space will be smaller the greater the debt burden
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